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Abstract
In order to support the increasing demand for clean sustainable electricity production and for
nuclear waste management, the Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) is being developed. The
main drawback has been its high capital and operating costs in comparison with traditional light
water reactors. In order to compete, the SFR must be shown to be economically competitive.
This study makes use of the proposed Technology Neutral Framework (TNF) being developed
by the U.S. NRC. By applying this risk-based approach to safety, rather than the traditional
approach of applying deterministic requirements, it will be shown that significant savings can be
realized without compromising fundamental safety.
A methodology was developed using the Technology Neutral Framework to judge design
alternatives based on risk significance that provide acceptable safety within the framework at
less cost. The key probabilistic metrics of Risk Achievement Worth and Limit Exceedence
Factor will be used to assess whether a system or component plays an important safety function.
If not the system, structure or component either can be eliminated, modified or its safety grade
can be reduced resulting in cost savings. In addition, assessments were made to determine how
to improve thermal efficiency by raising reactor exit temperature and by applying other design
alternatives to reduce costs as evaluated on a safety, reliability and economic basis. This
methodology was applied in a series of case studies demonstrating the value of the approach in
design. The probabilistic risk assessment, the reference economic model and the Technology
Neutral Framework tools required for this methodology are described.
A reference economic model for a pool-type SFR was developed using the G4-ECONS model
since it is an acceptable standard model for economic analysis. Since cost predictions for sodium
cooled fast reactors are highly uncertain, the results of the economic analysis are used to estimate
the relative improvement in cost as a function of the design alternatives proposed by the TNF
methodology approach. This study used generic and comparative numbers for the ALMR and S-
PRISM reactors for cost of components of the SFR, to identify capital cost drivers for further
study and cost reduction. For comparative purposes, the light water reactor (LWR) economic
model in the G4-ECONS model was used and benchmarked to current LWR data.
As a result of the case studies in which the methodology was applied, it was shown that the
capital cost of the SFR could be reduced by almost 18% ($336 million) over the reference design
and the levelized generating costs could be reduced by over 10% (almost 1 cent/kw-hr). These
savings come largely from improvements in thermal efficiency, elimination of the energetic core
disruptive accident as a design basis event and simplification of the reactor shutdown system
based on risk analysis and safety significance. Should this methodology be applied to the entire
plant design, it is expected that significant additional savings could be identified.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Thesis Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to develop a methodology to reduce the capital cost and increase
the competitiveness of sodium cooled fast reactors using a risk informed process in technology
selection and design. Rather than applying traditional deterministic regulatory requirements to
the design of sodium cooled fast reactors, the newly developed Technology Neutral Framework
(TNF) [U.S. NRC, NUREG-1860] will be used to identify licensing basis events which will be
used to judge safety of the plant. The TNF is a new methodology for licensing of nuclear
reactors using probabilistic safety analysis and establishing a safety goal based on acceptance
criteria which are dose based. Within this framework, certain event sequences when modeled in
the PRA have a very low probability of causing significant consequences. By studying these
events, opportunities for design simplification and cost reduction can be made without
compromising safety. Deterministically based design criteria do not allow for such
improvements in design or cost reduction. This approach may present the opportunity for
refinement of the reactor design by revealing components that are unnecessary or possibly over-
designed to compensate for requirements imposed according to current deterministic licensing
requirements.
This project is part of a larger multi-university Nuclear Energy Research Initiative Project
(Project # 08-020). The project team is made up of members from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Ohio State University, and Idaho State University. The main goal of the overall
project is to propose a methodology using risk-based methods to improve the Sodium-Cooled
Fast Reactor and to develop and describe tools that support this methodology. Specifically, this
thesis focuses on the economics of design choices and options using a probabilistic risk
assessment outputs to judge the acceptability of design options that could reduce costs within the
context of the TNF.
The objective is not to design a sodium cooled fast reactor but develop a systematic process to be
used in design. The challenge of this project is obtaining reliable cost estimates in sufficient
detail to test the methodology. To avoid absolutes, this project will focus on comparative
assessments of designs and cost estimates completed in the past. The most well documented is
the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor [Gluekler, 1997] since it has detailed costs at the component
level and a completed Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The goal is to show meaningful reductions
in cost which will then be compared to light water reactors. The main tool that will be used in
economic analysis is the G4-ECONS model, developed by the Generation IV International
Forum (GIF) Economic Modeling Working Group. Once a reasonable model has been
developed, areas for reduction in cost will be determined and specific items can be addressed.
With the use of the G4ECONS model, sensitivity analyses will be performed to quantify the
possible savings through specific changes to capital or operational cost, efficiency, and
availability. It is expected that this methodology could be used in the design of any future
reactor since the methodology will be generic.
1.2 Sodium Fast Reactor Background
Today, the world's population is growing at a rate of more than 1% annually [U.S. Census
Bureau], with all people striving for a better quality of life. Growing along with population is
the ever-increasing demand for energy, and all of the life-changing benefits that come with it.
However, in recent times there has also been an increased awareness of the detrimental effect of
this growth in demand on the environment, as traditional forms of power production tend to
create pollution and deplete the natural resources in all regions of the world. Therefore, there
must be a movement towards the development of technology that can produce the required
energy without these negative impacts. A leader in clean, safe and cost-effective power
production is nuclear energy. In their 2009 Annual Energy Outlook [Energy Information
Administration, 2009], the Energy Information Administration predicted a continued rise in
electricity demand shown in Figure 1.1, indicating that the demand for nuclear power would
continue to rise as well. According to the Table 1.1, the worldwide electricity demand is
predicted to continue to grow at 2.3% [Energy Information Administration, 2004].
Figure 1.1 - Predicted Energy Use by Fuel in the United States (1980-2030)
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Table 1.1 - World Net Electricity Consumption by Region (Billion kw-hr)
Projections Average
Annual
Percent
Change,
Region/Country 2001 2010 2015 2020 2025 2001-2025
lindustrialized Countries
North America 1 4,036 4,839 5,306 5,792 6,314 1.9
United States* 3,386 4,055 4,429 4,811 5,207 1.8
Canada 500 578 6307 680 728 1.6
Mexico 1501 206 247 3011 379 3.9
Western Europe 2,246 2,486 2,659 2,8391 3,029 1.3
Industrialized Asia 1 1,0141 1,132 1,2087 1,2791 1,3541 1.2
Japan 788 870 920 965 1,012 1.0
Australia/New Zealand 226 2621 288 3141 3421 1.8
Total Industrialized F-7,296 8,456 9,173F 9,9101 10,6971 1.6
EE/FSU
Former Soviet Union 1,397 1,6661 1,862 2,044 2,202 1.9
Eastern Europe 4181 515 585 662 739 2.4
Total EE/FSU 1,815 2,1811 2,447 2,706[ 2,9411 2.0
[Developing Countries
Developing Asia 1512,6501 3,7231 4,508[_ 5,3421 6,2741 3.7
China 1,237 1,856 2,322 2,8257 3,410 4.3
India 554 751 896 1,053 1,216 3.3
South Korea 231 318 3717 419 468 3.0
Other DevelopingAsia 6281 797 919 1,045 1,181 2.7
[MiIiddle East 1 476 635 723 818 926 2.8
Africa 384 4991 602[ 7161 8081 3.1
Central and South America 668 864 1,000 1,196 1,425 3.2
Total Developing 4,179 5,721 6,833 8,0721 9,4341 3.5
Total World 13,2901 16,3581 18,453 20,6881 23,0721 2.3
At the end of 2008, there were 438 nuclear reactors in operation worldwide, producing 16% of
total electricity, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA, 2009]. In
response to these increasing energy demands, the Agency predicts that nuclear energy will
increase in importance and require new construction over the next 25 years.
Realizing that new technology would be necessary to meet these worldwide energy demands in a
sustainable manner, ten countries - Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, the Republic of
Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States - agreed to a
system of international cooperation in these endeavors of research and development.
Representatives from each of these ten countries joined together to form the Generation IV
International Forum (GIF). The GIF defined four goal areas of focus for these advanced
reactors: sustainability, economics, safety and reliability, and proliferation resistance.
Six potential systems were identified as the most promising technologies to focus on, in order to
streamline the efforts on these specific projects. These six systems and their best-case
deployment dates are listed in Table 1.2. As seen in the table, the Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) is
viewed as the most developed of the Gen IV technologies and will most likely be the first of
these systems ready for deployment [U.S. DOE and GIF, 2002].
Table 1.2 - Gen IVSystems and Best Case Deployment Dates'
'Taken from the Gen-IV Roadmap, though not judged to be realistic at this point
Sodium Fast Reactor 2015
Very High Temp Reactor 2020
Gas Cooled Fast Reactor 2025
Molten Salt Reactor 2025
Super-Critical Water Reactor 2025
Lead-Cooled Fast Reactor 2025
1.2.1 The Sodium Fast Reactor
The Sodium Fast Reactor uses the fast neutron spectrum to maintain fission and produce energy.
The majority of natural uranium is the isotope U-238, making up about 99.3%. The remaining
0.7% is U-235, the isotope required for thermal fission in modern light water reactors. The fast
neutrons are used to breed plutonium from the U-238, and these plutonium isotopes then undergo
fission to produce heat. Therefore, the fast reactors can utilize uranium much more efficiently
than a thermal reactor. Because water acts a moderator and will slow the neutrons out of the fast
spectrum, liquid metals such as sodium are used as the coolant in these fast reactors, transferring
the heat from the core to a power conversion system used to produce electricity. Besides the
advantage of more efficient use of natural uranium, SFRs can also be used to breed fuel since
they can be designed to produce more fuel than they consume by the use of an external ring of
U-238, where the plutonium is bred for reprocessing and subsequent recycle. In addition, fast
reactors can be used for transmutation of nuclear waste with long half-lives into less troublesome
isotopes that will decay on a much shorter timescale [World Nuclear Association, 2009].
The GIF has ranked the SFR as a top prospect for the support of its goals in the four areas
previously mentioned. It is top-ranked in sustainability due to its closed fuel cycle and potential
for actinide management. The sustainability and actinide missions of the sodium cooled fast
reactors are the main drivers for developing this technology. It has also been ranked as good in
the other three areas: safety, economics, and proliferation resistance. Since there are several
operating sodium fast reactors around the world, most notably in Russia, France and Japan, this
technology is seen as being deployable with much less research and development than may be
required for some of the other technologies [U.S. DOE and GIF, 2002].
Figure 1.2 - Loop-Type and Pool-Type SFRs
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In Figure 1.2, basic schematics of both the pool-type and loop-type SFRs are shown. On the left,
the pool-type SFR has all reactor internals located within the primary sodium pool, including the
intermediate heat exchanger. The primary sodium never leaves the pool, making a loss of
coolant accident extremely unlikely. The pool-type will have a larger reactor vessel, but will be
simpler to construct and will have a smaller reactor building since more of the required
equipment will be located within the reactor vessel [Zhao, 2009].
The loop-type SFR has a more traditional reactor vessel with a primary sodium loop which is
connected to an external intermediate sodium-to-sodium heat exchanger which is then connected
to a steam generator for the production of power. The loop-type reactor has a smaller, but more
complicated reactor vessel, with more components located outside of the vessel itself. This
means that the external loops will require shielding, but permits easier in-service inspection and
maintenance which is one of its major advantages.
1.2.2 History of SFR Development
Sodium fast reactors had their start in 1946 with the US Clementine reactor at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. The initial concern was the supply of uranium to support the development
of nuclear power. While the US held the early lead in sodium reactor development with the
Experiment Breeder Reactor I and II, the US lead was lost to France and Russia who maintained
a fast reactor program while the US dropped its efforts in the 1980's. The initial application was
to breed plutonium for electricity production. In total, there have been about 20 SFRs
constructed worldwide. The most significant are shown in Table 1.3 [IAEA, 2006].
Table 1.3 - Significant Worldwide SFRs
Name Country Power (MWe) Year Loop or Pool
Clementine US 1946
EBR-1 US 0.2 1951
BR 5 Russia 1959 Loop
Dounreay FR UK 15 1959 Loop
EBR-2 US 20 1963 Pool
Fermi 1 US 66 1963 Loop
BOR 60* Russia 12 1969 Loop
BN350 Kazakhstan 130 1972 Loop
Phenix* France 250 1973 Pool
Prototype FR UK 270 1974 Loop
KNK II Germany 21 1977 Loop
BN600* Russia 600 1980 Pool
Fast Flux Test Fac. US 400 1980 Loop
Superphenix France 1240 1985 Pool
FBTR* India 13 1985 Loop
MONJU* Japan 280 1994 Loop
Of these reactors, five (marked by *) are operating or scheduled to resume operations as of 2008.
The EBR-2 was one of the most significant in demonstrating the safety potential of the SFR. It
was operated for 30 years without a major accident, and was used to demonstrate the passive
safety nature of pool type SFRs. Several reactors have operated for extended periods, including
Fermi 1 for 15 years and the BN600 that has been operating for close to 30 years. There have
been others however, that were shutdown prematurely due to sodium leaks and unreliable
operations, such as the Monju plant and SuperPhenix respectively [Carlson, 2009].
There is significant global experience with sodium cooled fast reactors but the operational
reliability has not met expectations. The capital cost of sodium cooled fast reactors is higher
than light water reactors and, at present, the fuel costs are also higher due to the need to
reprocess and re-fabricate plutonium fuel from the blanket zones.
1.2.3 Economic Issues
The challenge of developing an economically competitive reactor has been recognized by the
Generation IV initiative as a major obstacle impeding the deployment of these fast reactor
systems. The major challenge is the relatively high initial capital cost. As a result of the
Generation IV initiative, countries such as Japan and France have focused their design efforts on
redesigning the plant within the constraint of the safety requirements which are more challenging
for a sodium cooled system than a water system. The Japanese Atomic Energy Administration's
(JAEA) philosophy for capital cost reduction is to reduce the amount of material used in
construction by designing a larger plant while reducing the amount of steel required per unit
electricity produced. The JAEA believe that the benefits of scale will be realized through a
large, monolithic reactor with several loops. They also have attempted to design the loops while
using as little piping as possible to reduce additional cost. Finally, the JAEA is taking advantage
of advances in technology by assuming the development of new materials such as high-strength
steels and new components such as integrated heat exchangers and pumps because they foresee
this technology being available by the predicted SFR deployment dates. This approach is shown
in Figure 1.3 [JAEA, 2009].
Figure 1.3 - Japanese Method of Reducing Cost
MONJU:280Mwe
2.0M 20....J...  Innovative Teh Iog es
N. Breakdown list
0.6M -
0. 5M -e'hXwith
DFR 0.48DFBR 0.8~ Scale, Merit
S.4M 670M 2 loop heat
We
434%
0.3M -Twin Effect
.-
00.2M 
-l
o.1M F10005 line J B SFR:1500MWex2
(FOK) verigh Cot, ki g h - ritee
accotegatt LeanXn withc
The unit construction cost of Monju is expressed as the construction cost divided by electric power.
The unit construction cost of DFBR and JSFR are evaluated value
General Electric has taken a different approach to making the SFR economically competitive.
Their approach uses smaller reactors that allow the benefits of factory fabrication of components
and passive safety systems to be realized, while constructing each plant on a shorter timescale
[Boardman, 2000]. It is unclear at this time which approach will prove to be more successful at
reducing costs.
The economics of the SFR are driven in part by the need to maintain overall safety and the
uncertainty of the future licensing requirements of these advanced reactors. In past designs, a
large focus has been placed on dealing with the events such as fuel failure and energetic core
disruptive accidents. In the early days of the United States fast reactor breeder program, the
construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) was attempted, but ultimately
canceled due to escalating costs of construction and an unsure licensing and political climate.
The CRBR was estimated in 1972 to cost $699 million based on initial designs and estimates.
By the time the project was ultimately canceled after 11 years of development, the estimated cost
had ballooned to over $2.5 billion, and the schedule had been delayed to the point where the
reactor would not come online earlier than 1989. These increasing costs and schedule delays
were mainly caused due to funding restrictions and constantly changing licensing requirements,
resulting in multiple redesigns and the numerous additional safety systems [U.S. DOE, 1983].
Learning from this project, it becomes obvious that a better understanding of the licensing
environment and the requirements on these reactors is necessary. This can ensure that the
construction and startup occurs in a timely manner and within budget, preventing situations like
CRBR from occurring again.
Finally, a major issue that has affected the Sodium Fast Reactors has been their unreliability due
to costly technical problems with sodium systems. In France, SuperPhenix was shut down
repeatedly through its ten year operating life due to several sodium leaks [IAEA, 2006]. In
Japan, Monju encountered a thermo-well weld failure and sodium leak, resulting in a fire
[Carlson, 2009]. These failures have led to the permanent shutdown of the SuperPhenix and the
prolonged shutdown of the Monju plant in Japan. These operational issues significantly affect the
economics and perception of fast reactors as unreliable producers of electricity and need to be
addressed before SFRs are deployed in large numbers.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 - Methodology and Framework
Chapter 2 describes the development of the risk-based methodology that will be proposed for use
in this project. The process is described in a step-by-step manner, demonstrating the progression
from deciding on a design alternative, confirming that the design alternative meets safety
requirements, and finally to the determination of economic benefit. The process of confirming
safety compliance using this risk-based methodology and the Technology Neutral Framework is
described in detail.
Chapter 3 - Development of the Economic Model
Chapter 3 details the process of developing the reference economic model. The chapter begins
with a look into the current range of estimates for the different components of SFR cost: capital
cost, fuel cycle, operations and maintenance, and decommissioning and disposal. Then using the
ALMR as a reference design, an economic model is developed in as much detail as possible
using the G4-ECONS model. The validity of this economic model is discussed, as well as the
limitations.
Chapter 4 - Demonstration of Methodology through Case Studies
Chapter 4 is the culmination of the project, where the methodology is demonstrated to identify
possible economic gain in terms of reduced electricity cost. Methods of identifying potential
design alternatives are shown using risk-based methods and quantified using the economic
model. Each step in the methodology is shown to illuminate the use of this methodology. One
example, the removal of the Energetic Core Disruptive Accident from possible Licensing Basis
Events, is shown as a major catalyst for savings. Another example, manufacturing the Steam
Generator as non-safety grade, initially appears to have the potential for large savings, but
ultimately results in little gains after performing the economic analysis. Overall, these case
studies demonstrate the use of the different tools that were developed and described in the
previous chapters.
Chapter 2 - Methodology and Framework
2.1 Developing the Framework and Methodology
2.1.1 Framework and Methodology Description
In an effort to reduce the cost of the Sodium Fast Reactor to levels where it can be economically
competitive in the electricity market, a risk-based methodology is proposed. The main goal of
this methodology is to enable a process through which economic improvements can be made on
existing reactor designs, while still conforming to safety requirements. The methodology will
utilize the flexibility in design allowed in the Technology Neutral Framework proposed by the
U.S. NRC in NUREG-1860. Once the necessary tools are developed, this methodology and
framework will be a useful method to reduce the overall cost of electricity. Figure 2.1
graphically illustrates the basic methodology which is explained below.
Figure 2.1 - The Proposed Risk-Based Framework
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This process begins by identifying an area of focus. This may be done several ways: through the
identification of major cost drivers, through deterministic improvements such as increasing
efficiency, or through identification of areas with unnecessarily higher safety margins than
required under the Technology Neutral Framework.
Once the area of focus is determined, the risk-based methods must be used to determine all
potential effects that might affect the safety. The most effective tool for doing this is the
reactor-specific PRA, which will be central to the development of a safety model. All sequences
that may be affected by a proposed change must be identified. These sequences are defined by
event trees and fault trees that describe the reactor's response to different scenarios based on the
performance of the components in each system.
Once these sequences are identified, a list of the systems, structures and components (SSCs) that
perform the necessary functions can be compiled. The PRA will show the level of contribution
for each of the SSCs and their overall importance to the safety case. At this point, different risk-
based methods may be used to identify the importance of a system, structure or component to
safety. These risk-based methods include the use of importance measures such as the Risk
Achievement Worth (RAW) and the Limit Exceedance Factor (LEF). The systems, structures or
components with a low RAW or high LEF are candidates for removal, lowering of safety grade
or design modification without significantly affecting the safety of the plant while possibly
reducing the cost. These will be explained in detail later in this chapter.
The proposed design alternative must be checked against the TNF safety framework to ensure
that it continues to meet the safety standard as established in the Technology Neutral
Framework. During this step, confirmation of the safety analysis of the plant will be required to
support the event and fault tree analysis of the plant to be sure that the change can be
implemented without significant changes in the safety performance of the plant. If the design
alternative is shown to not meet the standard, the idea must be reformulated in such a way that it
will comply. If the design alternative does meet the standard, it can continue to the next stage.
Once the design alternative has been shown to meet all standards of safety, the economic benefit
of the proposed change must be determined. There are two main economic figures that are
important to the scope of this framework: overnight capital cost given in $/kwe and Levelized
Unit Electricity Cost (LUEC) in mills/kw-hr. The LUEC is the most important, since this
represents the base cost of electricity production for this reactor. The busbar LUEC for the
Sodium Fast Reactor can be directly compared to a busbar LUEC for any other power plant type,
showing the relative cost of the SFR against light water reactors or traditional fossil fuel power
plants. This direct comparison will show how competitive the SFR can be against other power
generation sources. The capital cost represents the upfront investment that must be made to
build a Sodium Fast Reactor. For nuclear plants in general and for sodium cooled fast reactors,
the capital cost is the largest contributor to the cost of electricity. The larger capital cost
represents increased risk to potential investors, especially until the technology has been
demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable to justify this large initial investment.
The economic benefit will be determined by how the design alternative affects either the LUEC
or the overnight capital cost. It is important that all aspects such as the impact on reliability,
maintenance or operability of the design alternative are taken into consideration, not only the
effects on capital cost. At this point, the economic consequences of the design alternative should
be reviewed, as the process may have illuminated other areas that should be considered as areas
for possible economic improvement.
2.1.2 Required Tools for this Framework
The two main tools that will be essential to this methodology are a Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) model and an economic model. The PRA model is an integral part of this methodology,
as it is used to identify sequences of interest and to check that the design alternative meets the
safety requirements as specified in the Technology Neutral Framework. The economic model
will be very important for the final step of the methodology, to determine the overall economic
effect of the design alternative. The economic model must provide results in terms of the busbar
LUEC and overnight capital cost in order to allow for a full economic consequence analysis of
the potential design alternatives.
Both of these models should be easily modified to account for changes that will be suggested
through the proposed design alternatives. They should also have a large range of potential inputs
that can be modified to allow for the most flexibility in design analysis. If possible, these models
should be user-friendly and present the results in a clear and concise manner, for the greatest
ease of use.
Traditional design analysis tools are also necessary to complete this analysis. These tools
include safety and thermal analysis codes to confirm that the designs proposed do not
compromise the overall safety or performance of the plant. The results of these analyses are then
fed back into the PRA model for reanalysis to confirm TNF acceptance.
2.1.3 Technology Neutral Framework Background
As these advanced reactor types are being developed, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) has begun to realize that the current licensing process may impede these new
technologies. The current licensing requirements in the NRC's Code of Federal Regulations
(CFRs) are largely deterministic which were created to license light water reactors (LWRs). The
NRC is developing a preliminary framework of a risk-informed and performance based licensing
structure that may be used to license future non-water nuclear power plants and to allow for a
more risk-informed design of light water reactors. This framework has been called the
Technology Neutral Framework (TNF), since it will be focused on determining requirements
based on safety and risk, regardless of the technology.
The TNF would allow for a broader use of technology specific risk information using a
probabilistic risk assessment developed for each reactor design. This allows the safety analysis
and regulatory oversight to focus on the items most important to the safety for that design. The
framework would stress safety performance as the metric for acceptability, giving the designers
more flexibility to decide on features most appropriate to their design [U.S. NRC, NUREG -
1860].
2.2 The Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model
In order to use the proposed framework, a probabilistic risk assessment model is needed to
support the Technology Neutral Framework approach. A probabilistic safety model will be
largely design specific, since individual probabilities and frequencies are assigned based on the
SSCs of the particular design. In this thesis, two available PRAs will be used: one of the
Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) [El-Shiekh, 1994] and the other the PRISM reactor
[Hackford, 1986].
2.2.1 Using the Technology Neutral Framework
The Technology Neutral Framework presents an opportunity to make use of the PRA to systems,
structures and components in terms of safety importance. Using the TNF approach, Licensing
Basis Events (LBE) for which must be designed are determined using the results of the PRA.
Using PRA, events are classified according to their frequency and consequences as represented
as a possible public radiation dose. Figure 2.2 shows the proposed frequency-consequence curve
[U.S. NRC, NUREG 1860].
Figure 2.2 - Frequency Consequence Curve from NUREG-1860
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Any event with a mean frequency greater than 10-7 per reactor year is subject to the requirements
of this curve. An event needs not to be considered as a LBE if the event can be shown through
the PRA to have a point estimate frequency below 10-8 or if the mean frequency is below 10- per
reactor year. Therefore, if all possible events initiated by failures from a single system, structure
or component fall below these limits, this item may be targeted for possible removal or
simplification and thus potential cost reduction.
2.2.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
The main way to determine frequencies and consequences of certain events is to use Probabilistic
Risk Assessment. Through the use of PRA, fault trees and event trees can be constructed and the
overall frequencies for different possible end states are produced. Based on the consequences
associated with each of these end states, the worst-case scenario for each event can be identified.
This combination of a frequency and consequence can be used with the TNF to determine
whether or not the sequence falls within the acceptable or unacceptable region of the Frequency-
Consequence Curve in Figure 2.2.
The main tool that can be used in the PRA analysis of Sodium Fast Reactors is the collection of
event trees developed in the ALMR [El-Shiekh, 1994] and PRISM PRA [Hackford, 1986]
reports. Since the reference reactors used for this study are based on a pool-type ALMR reactor,
the fault trees, event trees, initiating event frequencies and system reliabilities from these reports
will be representative of the pool-type design used as a reference model. There are two main
types of PRA analysis: Level 1 and Level 2/3. Level 1 PRA estimates the frequency of core
damage. This is usually based on the safety equipment included in the specific reactor designs,
so the confidence in Level 1 PRA results tends to be relatively high. Level 2 and 3 PRA estimate
the source terms, magnitude of releases and the possible consequences from these releases.
These analyses tend to contain more unpredictable variables, and will have more uncertainty
[U.S. NRC, Fact Sheet, 2007].
The Appendices of the ALMR PRA and PRISM PRA contain event trees for many different
initiating events, describing the possible sequences that could occur and the final core damage
state that would result from each. These have been analyzed to best understand the sequences
with extremely low frequencies, as well as the sequences that may require special consideration
within a risk-informed methodology.
2.2.3 Determine Safety Requirements Using the TNF
Using the TNF, there is a specific process that must be followed to determine the safety
requirements. The design-specific PRA should be used to select all sequences that represent
potentially risk-significant accident challenges. These should include all frequent, infrequent
and rare initiating event sequences. Once this list is compiled, the PRA analysis can be used to
determine where each of these events falls in respect to the Frequency-Consequence Curve.
Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) are determined through a process of binning sequences which all
share similar phenomenology. If any sequence in a bin has a point estimate frequency higher
than 10-, then the sequences must be analyzed further to determine the mean frequencies. At
this point, if the mean frequency of any sequence in the bin is above 10-7, then this bin will be
considered an LBE. The highest frequency of all sequences in each bin is selected and paired
with the highest consequence of all sequences in the same bin. This is then the point that is
plotted on the Frequency-Consequence curve as an LBE.
A stringent requirement of the TNF regarding the LBEs states that only SSC's that are
considered as safety grade items can be credited in the LBE analysis and are subject to special
treatment. Therefore, any function or capability of an SSC that is not safety grade must be set to
have a failure probability of 1.0 for guaranteed failure. This means that only safety-related
components are credited for prevention or mitigation of any event. This requirement is very
important for the analysis of whether or not items should be manufactured as safety grade or
non-safety grade. A component is not important as a safety grade item if its safety functions can
be removed from the PRA with minimal consequences. Removal of the safety grade status on a
component can result in significant cost reduction, which needs to be considered in achieving the
goal of economic performance.
There are two ways to meet the requirements of the TNF. The first is to determine that the PRA
sequence will have a frequency point estimate of less than 10~8/yr. The NUREG specifically
instructs to "drop" these from consideration as a Licensing Basis Event. The second method is
to confirm that the event falls within the acceptable region of the curve based on risk and
consequence.
If a sequence has a point estimate of greater than 10~8 /yr and through uncertainty analysis can be
shown to have a mean frequency of greater than 10-7/yr, then it must be analyzed further. For
such events that must be considered, the consequence of its end state must be determined through
Level 2 and 3 analyses to ensure that the associated frequency and consequence will fall within
the acceptable region of the curve. These higher frequency events may still have room for
savings if the consequences remain within the limits of the TNF for the determined event
frequency.
Any changes to the design of the reactor must be checked against these TNF standards using the
PRA approach. This is most easily done in the situation where an SSC is removed entirely or
changed from safety-significant component to a commercial grade component. In this instance,
all functions of this component within the PRA can be set to always fail.
Sequences with mean frequencies higher than 10 ~7 must fall within the acceptable region of the
Frequency-Consequence Curve. The higher frequencies do not necessarily mean that the design
change (ex. Component or system removed, simplified, or lowered in safety grade status) is
unacceptable. For example, in Figure 2.3, Sequence A lies within the acceptable region of the
curve and would meet the safety requirements of the TNF. However, there is room under the
curve in both directions indicating that changes in the design may be permitted. If a design
alternative was proposed that resulted in a higher dose while maintaining the same frequency, the
resulting sequence could be plotted at point A'. Likewise, a design alternative could be proposed
that would result in a higher frequency without significantly changing the dose, moving the
sequence to point A". For the sequence illustrated above, either of those design alternatives
would be acceptable under the TNF, and the one with the greatest economic benefit should be
selected.
Figure 23 - TNF Acceptability
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This analysis is more complicated when an operating condition is changed. For example, if the
design core outlet temperature was increased, the probabilities of failure for many different
components may be affected in many different sequences. These probabilities must be
determined through modeling and other analyses before the PRA analysis can be performed
[U.S. NRC, NUREG-1860].
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2.2.4 Using PRA Analysis
When using the TNF as the standard for safety acceptance criteria, Level 1 PRA analysis is
needed. A plant specific PRA will include a collection of event trees that describe possible
accident scenarios and the probabilities of success or failure at each possible opportunity for
prevention or mitigation. At the end of each Level 1 event tree, there are many possible end
states that may be reached depending on the success or failure of each of the SSCs within the
tree, which defines a set of similar consequences for the end states. Although each possible end
state will be different depending on the mitigating circumstances, groups of similar end states are
binned together as classes. These classes identify the defining attribute that describes the end
state. Figure 2.4 is a page taken out of the ALMR PRA [EI-Sheikh, 1994] describing the
possible classes that can result from the various event trees.
Figure 2.4 - End State Classes from ALMR PRA
DVL Double vessel (reactor vessel and containment vessel) leak
LOF3-4 Loss of power to the primary EMPs with 3 or 4 synchronous
machines operating
LOF3-4CD Same as LOF3-4
LOF2CD Loss of power to the primary EMPs with 2 synchronous machines
operating
LOFICD Loss of power to the primary EMPs with only 1 synchronous
machine operating
LOFOCD Loss of power to the primary EMPs with none of the synchronous
machines operating
OP-4D Less than 10% safe overpower operation for 4 days
OK Safe shutdown or power operation.
RUTOP Reference ATWS UTOP
RULOF Reference ATWS ULOF
RULOHS Reference ATWS ULOHS
SD Same as OK for safe shutdown
2SIGSD Shutdown with the decay heat level at the 2-sigma level (115% of
nominal)
SPO Same as OK for safe power operation
BUTOPLHS Benign combined UTOP/ULOHS accident (with consequences
similar to those of reference ALMR ATWS accidents)
Core Damage Categories:
A Creep rupture of the fuel clad for up to 25% of the fuel assemblies
B Category A plus eutectic attack of up to 25% more fuel assemblies
C Fuel melting and dispersal of up to 25% of the core
D Whole core meltdown
5-11
Based on preliminary Level 2/3 consequence analysis, the estimated dose can be calculated for
each of the possible end states. Depending on the sequence frequency, the associated sequence
end state must be labeled as acceptable or unacceptable, according to the TNF guidelines.
In order to more easily analyze the event trees given in a PRA, the event trees with their
associated probabilities can be entered into a code such as the Systems Analysis Program for
Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluation (SAPHIRE). SAPHIRE allows the user to modify
probabilities or remove components from the event trees entered from the PRA. The code will
then output the new probabilities of reaching each possible end state. This capability allows the
user to track the effect of changes made to any system, especially the probabilities of reaching
the most damaging end states.
Figure 2.5 is one event tree from the ALMR PRA showing the possible progression of events
following a 0.6-1.0g Seismic Event. The event tree shows the initiating event frequency and all
possible mitigating steps with their associated probabilities of success and failure. For this event
tree, the possible end states are OK, A and C. Referring to Figure 2.4, OK will always be
considered acceptable and both A and C may be unacceptable, since they result in core damage.
It must be determined using Level 2/3 analysis whether end states A and C are acceptable or
unacceptable. Once the criteria for acceptable and unacceptable are established, the associated
probabilities can be determined. In this example however, due to the low initiating event
frequency of 8 x 10- and the high scram reliability, most of the sequence probabilities fall well
below the 10- threshold for point estimates, and will be screened from consideration as potential
LBEs. The point estimates that are above the threshold may be considered in the licensing
process.
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2.3 Using Importance Measures to Analyze Safety within the TNF
The SAPHIRE code can be used to process PRA results in a relatively easy manner to identify
contributions of systems, structures and components to the overall safety of the plant. There are
many useful importance measures that can be used as metrics in determining the safety
importance of SSC's. Those considered in this analysis are Risk Achievement Worth (RAW)
and Limit Exceedance Factor (LEF).
Risk Achievement Worth
One importance measure that can be used is the Risk Achievement Worth (RAW). The RAW
for a component is the conditional probability of overall system failure given component failure
divided by the failure probability of the system under normal conditions [Cheok, et al. 1998]:
Equation 2.1 - Risk Achievement Worth
P (System Failure I Component Failure)R AW =
P (System Failure)
The RAW value of components can be easily calculated using the SAPHIRE code, simply by
changing the probability of failure for every function of the component to 1.0. The probability of
system failure is determined by taking the sum of the probabilities for all classes that have been
identified as failed end states.
The RAW value that is obtained can be 1.0 or higher. A RAW value of 1.0 indicates that the
system does not rely heavily on that component, but a high RAW value does not provide
sufficient information to determine the importance of the component. A high RAW does not
necessarily mean that the component cannot be changed or modified, instead it merely indicates
that the component and its functions should not be eliminated. Table 2.1 presents several RAW
values for systems in the PRISM design, using a large release of radioactivity as the failure
criteria [Johnson and Apostolakis, 2009].
Table 2.1 - RAW values for systems in the PRISM design
Event RAW (Large Release)
Reactor Protection System/Plant Control System 1.55 x 102
Signal
Reactor Shutdown System (Scram) 7.87 x 106
Pump Coast Down 2.021
Nominal Inherent Reactivity Feedback 1.992
Operating Power Heat Removal 1.01
Shutdown Heat Removal through the Intermediate 1.90 x 103
Heat Transfer System
Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) 2.42 x I04
The RAW value is an indicator that can show directly the significance of each component in the
overall safety case of the reactor. If this component is not important is can be removed or have it
safety classification changed. As previously explained, any component that is not manufactured
to safety grade standards cannot be credited in the LBE analysis. For example, if a design option
was to remove the pump coastdown from the PRISM reactor design, the PRA and supporting
safety analysis would have to be modified so that any increase in safety provided by the pump
coastdown is not accounted for during any event tree. The probability of failure under these new
conditions would be the previous probability multiplied by the RAW value, 2.021 in the case of
PRISM. In analyses such as these, where SSCs are being removed or downgraded out of the
safety grade categories, the RAW value can be a very quick and useful tool to use in this
methodology.
Limit Exceedence Factor
Another importance measure that can be of use in the safety analyses under the TNF
methodology is the Limit Exceedence Factor (LEF). This importance measure is valuable
because it measures importance of a specific component with respect to the maximum allowable
risk within a system. The LEF is the probability of failure for a component that causes the overall
sequence frequency to be equal to the limit divided by the original component failure probability.
Equation 2.2 -Limit Exceedence Factor
= P(Comp. Fail.)so that P (System Fail.) = Limit
P(Component Failure)
Specifically under the TNF, the numerator of the LEF represents the frequency of failure that
would make the overall system failure for the most dominant sequence a value of 10-8/yr. For
any system with extremely low frequencies, the LEF will be larger than unity, with larger values
of LEF indicating more margin to the limit. Table 2.2 shows several values of LEF as
determined from the PRISM PRA. Items with large LEF values may be identified as possible
components that can be targeted for simplification [Johnson and Apostolakis, 2009].
Table 2.2 - Sample LEF Values for the PRISM
Event LEF
Reactor Protection System/ PCS Signal 1.9E7
Reactor Shutdown System (SCRAM) 38
Shutdown Heat Removal through Intermediate 7.8
Loop
Reactor Vessel Air Cooling System (RVACS) 7.2
2.3.1 Identifying with PRA and Importance Measures
In the previous description, it was shown how importance measures such as the RAW and LEF
could be used in the safety analyses of the methodology. The RAW value for any given
component can be used to identify possible candidates for removal from a specific design. Any
component with a RAW value close to unity is not very important for meeting the safety
requirements under the TNF, and therefore they may be removed completely or at least removed
simply from the safety grade category. Removing a component completely can potentially save
on capital cost, and removing a component from safety grade may save on capital cost and has
the potential to also simplify the licensing process.
The LEF metric assessed the margin of the SSCs, indicating components that provide excessive
margin or reliability beyond what is required in the TNF. These components may serve an
important function in the safety framework, which would lead to a high RAW, but may not be
required to be as reliable to ensure frequencies below 10-8/yr. Identifying components with high
LEF values may allow for simplification of systems, which can lead to potential capital cost
savings.
Finally, the PRA model can be used in conjunction with the Frequency Consequence Curve to
determine components that may be more reliable (very low failure rate or too much redundancy
for function) than necessary, even for frequencies above the 10~8 threshold. Any changes in
design will require a safety re-analysis and an updated Level 2/3 consequence analysis to
confirm that the doses are within acceptable levels.
2.4 Identifying Potential Design Alternatives
The risk assessment approach is a method for identifying systems component and structures that
are not safety significant followed by subsequent confirmatory analysis and determination of
potential cost savings. Another approach is to focus on high capital cost areas of the plant to see
if changes in design can be made to reduce these costs. Using an economic model of the plant,
areas of high cost and potential high value reductions can be identified. Savings in capital cost or
increases in efficiency or capacity factor will have the greatest impact on the levelized cost of
electricity. Therefore, these are the areas that should be concentrated on most heavily.
2.4.1 Identifying with the Economic Data
Once the economic model has been developed, it can be used as a tool to identify high cost areas
within the specific design. Capital cost has been determined as the largest contributor to the
LUEC. As will be shown in Chapter 3, a reduction in capital cost by 7.4% can result in a LUEC
reduction of 5%. Table 2.3 contains an abridged list by category of the Direct Capital Costs
(Equipment) of one ALMR reactor block, developed for the 1994 ALMR Cost Estimate
[Gokcek, 1995]. These costs represent the overnight value of the reactor block, and do not
account for the construction cost. The second column shows the percentage of total direct
capital cost for each category.
Using this information, specific areas of construction can be identified as the largest contributors
to the total capital cost. For example, the steam generator makes up almost 10.5% of the total
capital cost, the turbine generator makes up almost 9%, and the reactor internals almost 8%.
These large percentages may indicate that there could be room for significant overall savings and
can provide an initial indication of areas on which to focus effort. In a case study in Chapter 4,
possible savings through the steam generator are explored.
Table 2.3 - 1994 ALMR Direct Capital Cost Breakdown
(Equipment Cost Only)
Account No 1994 k$
211 Yard Work $16,116.00 2.22%
212 Reactor Facilities $72,804.00 10.02%
213 Turbine Generator Building $9,678.00 1.33%
218N Maintenance Shop $11,087.00 1.53%
21 Total $137,410.00 18.92%
220A.211 Reactor Vessels $25,602.00 3.53%
220A.212 Reactor Internals $55,595.00 7.65%
220A.213 Control Rod Drives $9,676.00 1.33%
220A.221 Primary Heat Transport System $46,241.00 6.37%
220A.222 Intermediate Heat Transport System $48,400.00 6.66%
220A.223 Steam Generator System $75,702.00 10.42%
220A.231 Back-up Heat Removal System $1,612.00 0.22%
220A.15 Fuel Handling and Storage $7,677.00 1.06%
220A.268 Maintenance Equipment $25,878.00 3.56%
220A.27 Instrumentation and Control $20,260.00 2.79%
220A.31 Support Engineering $38,414.00 5.29%
225 Fuel Handling $10,805.00 1.49%
22 Total $403,029.00 55.49%
231 Turbine Generator $64,601.00 8.89%
23 Total $95,424.00 13.14%
242 Station Service Equipment $19,554.00 2.69%
245 Electric Structure and Wiring $11,233.00 1.55%
246 Power and Control Wiring $10,346.00 1.42%
24 Total $47,735.00 6.57%
252 Air,Water and Steam Service Sys $8,790.00 1.21%
253 Communication Equipment $8,642.00 1.19%
25 Total $25,788.00 3.55%
262 Mechanical Equipment $16,899.00 2.33%
26 Total $16,899.00 2.33%
Total Direct Capital Costs $726,285.00
2.5 Development of the Economic Model
The main goal of this work is to find ways to reduce the overall cost of electricity for the given
reference reactor plant design. The cost of electricity will have many components, and any
design alternative that may affect one or more of these components. In Chapter 3 the process
will be described through which an example economic model will be developed. Consistent with
the reference design used in the safety model, the economic model is based on the ALMR.
The most important part in the development of the reference model is to determine the validity of
the inputs that are being used. There has not been considerable experience in building Sodium
Fast Reactors in the past, so it may be difficult to obtain reliable information. However, it will
be possible to compare the cost of SFRs against the cost of a modern light water reactor using
published information. Modern LWR costs will be easier to determine to assess the relative
differences in SFR cost data.
2.6 Methodology Example
In Chapter 4, several case studies will be performed that will demonstrate the use of the
methodology and the tools described in this chapter. In order to clearly demonstrate the
methodology shown in Figure 2.1, a step-by-step breakdown is described below:
Step 1 - Identify Potential Area of Focus
Based on the economic data presented in Table 2.3, identify one of the costly systems, structures
and components that should be targeted. This large cost driver may be an area where changes can
result in potential economic savings.
Step 2 - Using Risk Model, Apply TNF to Determine Sequences of Interest for Safety Case
Using the PRA, identify that the sequences of interest were those that used this SSC to mitigate
the damage states in case of an accident.
Step 3 - Determine Systems and Components that are used in these Sequences
Determine what specific systems, structures and component were used in the sequences that
might be removed or modified.
Step 4 - Use Importance Measures or Other PRA Approaches to Identify Design Alternatives
Calculate the RAW and LEF values for the SSC to see if it plays a significant safety role and
could be modified.
Step 5 - Confirm Design Alternative meets the TNF Standards using Risk-Based Methods
Set the component failure probability to 1.0 to assess impact. Confirm with safety analysis and
other factors (overall plant reliability) to see if this change is warranted and if the TNF is
satisfied.
Step 6 - Determine Economic Benefit and Gain Insights to Further Improve Economics
Calculate the economic gain from the proposed design modification and tabulate overall system
savings for each proposed change.
Step 7 - Identify other Non-PRA Based Changes
Consider other improvements such as means to increase thermal efficiency (raising core outlet
temperature, different power conversion systems, improvement in capacity factor, etc) that
require design modifications which may have an impact on the safety of the plant. Apply steps
1-6 again to assess safety impact and economic value.
Chapter 3 - Development of the Economic Model
3.1 Overview
The economic model to be used in this framework was developed as a tool to determine the
economic benefits of possible design alternatives. The first step in developing the economic
model was to gather available information for the cost of the Sodium Fast Reactor. Due to the
relative lack of experience in industry, the availability of accurate and reliable cost information
was limited to cost estimates provided by developers. For the purpose of this analysis, the cost
estimates of developers were assumed and not challenged. Even when corrected for inflation,
these numbers appear to be low relative to light water rector cost estimates despite the obvious
differences in complexity of design of the two types of plants. Four major cost areas were
identified in the lifetime of an SFR: Capital Costs, Operations and Maintenance Costs, Fuel
Costs and Decommissioning Costs. All available information in various levels of detail was
gathered, as well as expert opinion on the expected cost for these major areas.
The most detailed data was available for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) which
was selected for use in construction of the economic model. The categorized inputs were entered
into the G4-ECONS model, producing the outputs in the form of the Levelized Unit Electricity
Cost (LUEC) and the Total Capital Cost.
The data was then analyzed to confirm the validity of the model by comparing several applicable
categories to similar information from an LWR model used in the Generation IV roadmap
exercise [US DOE and GIF, 2002]. Adjustments were made to compensate for the
inconsistencies between the two models. These inconsistencies were largely in the area of
balance of plant systems and site infrastructure.
Using the economic model, sensitivity analyses were performed to determine the effects of
changing the possible inputs. Five main areas of interest were identified: capital cost, operations
and maintenance cost, fuel cost, overall efficiency, and capacity factor. Any changes to these
areas would have a significant effect on the overall LUEC. The individual effects of reductions
in each of these areas were then shown.
3.2 Gathered Data
3.2.1 Capital Cost
Available capital cost information was gathered for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR)
[U.S. DOE, 1983], Japanese Sodium Fast Reactor (JSFR) [Ono et al, 2007], S-PRISM
[Boardman, 2001], and the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) [Gokcek et al, 1995]. The
cost data is generally presented as lumped figures at a relatively low level of detail. These
figures can be used to develop a range of capital cost estimation available from industry. The
results are presented in Table 3.1 corrected for inflation up to 2007 using the escalation factors
presented in the G4-ECONS guidelines [GIF, 2007].
Table 3.1 -Summary of Collected Data: Capital Costs (2007$)
Net Capacity Total Capital Total Capital Cost
(MWe) Cost ($M) ($/kwe)
CRBR 380 5,032 13,242
JSFR 1500 2,445 1,630
S-PRISM* 1651 3,024 1,832
ALMR* 622 1,538 2,472
*S-PRISM is a modular reactors with multiple small reactors per plant
The Clinch River Breeder Reactor was a prototype design in the 1970's and was eventually
abandoned due to the escalating costs. In contrast, the other three data points are based on more
modern SFR designs and are all within the same relative range of capital cost.
Only the S-PRISM and the ALMR have more detailed cost breakdowns that can be presented in
terms of the GIF Code of Accounts [GIF, 2007] to provide some comparison value. Due to the
large difference in electrical generating capacity, the main item of comparison was the percent of
total overnight capital cost as a fraction of the total overnight capital cost for each of the
categories. These percentages nearly matched across all accounts, varying by no more than 3%.
See Table 3.2 for details. This implies a certain level of reliability between these two data sets.
The most detailed cost information available was with the ALMR. In the "1994 Capital and
Busbar Cost Estimate", complete detailed cost estimation is presented according to the GIF Code
of Accounts (COA) [Gokcek et al, 1995], including breakdowns within each code. This level of
detail will allow for the development of a fairly detailed reference economic model for the pool-
type Sodium Fast Reactor.
Table 3.2 - Comparison of Percentage Capital Costs: ALMR and S-PRISM
ALMR % of S-PRISM % Diff. in % of
COA Categories Total Cost of Total Cost Total Cost
20 Land and Land Rights 1% 0% 1%
21 Structures and Improvements 13% 10% 3%
22 Reactor Plant Equipment 38% 37% 0%
23+25 Turbine Plant and Heat Rejection 11% 11% 0%
24 Electric Plant Equipment 4% 5% -1%
26 Misc. Plant Equipment 2% 2% 1%
33 Construction Services 8% 6% 2%
31 Engineering and home office 5% 3% 3%
35 Field supervision 5% 3% 1%
44 Owners Cost 14% 12% 2%
3.2.2 Operations and Maintenance Costs
Available O&M Costs were also gathered from SFR sources to determine reasonable estimates
to use in the economic modeling of the reactor. The results are presented in Table 3.3. As with
the capital cost, these numbers were provided in different levels of detail, ranging from a simple
quote for mills/kw-hr to a more detailed breakdown into categories such as labor costs and
consumables.
Table 3.3 - Summary of Collected Data: Operation & Maintenance Costs (2007$)
O&M Costs
(mills/kw-hr)
ALMR (622 MWe Plant) 11.92
IFR (1488 MWe Plant) 13.01
S-PRISM (1520 MWe
Plant) 7.63
Nuclear Industry (NEI) 12.90
The most detailed set of O&M numbers provided is the 622 MWe ALMR [Gokcek et al, 1995].
Since the breakdown level of detail required for the G4ECONS model was available for the
ALMR, these values will be used for the reference model. It was not possible to explain the
large discrepancy between the S-PRISM and ALMR costs since the S-PRISM numbers were not
available at a suitable level of detail. The ALMR quoted O&M cost is within an acceptable
range when compared to the NEI average values for the industry [Nuclear Energy Institute, May
2008]. Whether this SFR value is correct is not challenged in this thesis.
3.2.3 Fuel Cycle Costs
To determine reasonable estimates for use in the economic model, Fuel Cycle Costs were
collected from various estimates such as the S-PRISM [Boardman, 2000], IFR [Lineberry et al,
1986], the S-PRISM Fuel Cycle Study [Dubberly, 2003], and the ALMR [Gokcek et al, 1995].
Like the capital costs and O&M costs, these were provided at various levels of detail. The most
useful were those that were provided in terms of mills/kW-hr, since this was the input required
for the economic model. Unlike the previous categories, there is less concrete cost data on the
fuel cycle, since at this point there are still competing options for reprocessing and types of fuel.
These options are beyond the scope of this project, and will not be discussed further. The results
are presented in Table 3.4. These varying SFR values are compared to the Reference LWR value
from the GIF Model [GIF, 2008]. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) reports were
reviewed, but there was no economic data available that described the fuel cycle cost input to a
power reactor.
Table 3.4 -Summary of Collected Data: Fuel Cycle Costs
Fuel Cost
(mills/kw-hr)
S-PRISM (1997$) 5.0
IFR (1986$) 7.0
S-PRISM Fuel Cycle Study (2003$) 4.6
ALMR (1994) 10.22
Reference LWR (2007$) 9.07
For consistency, the number that will be applied to the G4ECONS model will be the ALMR
value from the "1994 Capital and Busbar Cost Estimate." This number has been supplied as the
fuel cycle busbar cost for a Central Fuel Recycle Facility [Gokcek et al, 1995]. Again, the
accuracy of this value is not challenged in this thesis.
3.3 Development of a Reference Model
The economic model should be based on a reasonably accurate reference model even if only
used for a comparative analysis. But with little data available for the cost of a Sodium Fast
Reactor, it becomes difficult to assess the validity of the collected values. The best tool that can
be developed from the data is a model that is consistent with the available information. This
model will be based closely on the ALMR, since the plant design and applicable features
represent a basic pool-type Generation IV SFR.
Once the reference model has been developed and an estimated cost breakdown has been
produced, the cost savings or excess expenditures for any modifications can be applied to these
categories to judge the relative savings possible. In this manner, the overall effect on capital cost
and busbar generation costs can be realized for each design modification that is proposed using
the Technology Neutral Framework.
According to the G4 Estimating Guidelines [GIF, 2007], top-down cost estimation can be
sufficient to approximately estimate costs when there is little cost data available. As long as
consistent estimating techniques are followed, comparisons can be made between design
alternatives. This basic model can also be modified and refined as more information becomes
available.
3.3.1 Using the G4ECONS model
The G4-ECONS model is an economic modeling tool that was developed by the GIF/Economic
Modeling Working Group as a tool for Generation IV reactor cost modeling [GIF, 2008]. The
model is designed to utilize the user input results from a top-down or bottom-up estimation
process of the capital, fuel cycle, and operational costs. These inputs are processed based on the
reactor specifications and the desired reactor application (electricity, process heat, etc.), and
levelized output costs are displayed. Based on the level of detail of the inputs to the model,
many different cost breakdowns within the calculations are available, such as within the fuel
cycle or financing models. The user can make use of these features if enough detail is available.
If less detailed information is available, lumped values can be input for the O&M, Fuel Cycle, or
Capital Cost categories by applying the lumped figures to the "Contingency" category.
The first few generic data inputs are designed to describe reactor performance and the economic
climate which will influence financing and most importantly the Levelized Unit Electricity Cost
(LUEC). Reactor inputs include total thermal power, thermal efficiency, capacity factor, and
years to construct. These shall be provided by the designer of the reactor. Several of these
generic data inputs are not used, depending on the level of detail for the specific reactor design.
For example for the ALMR, the site size and cost of land was not required because the total cost
of land was already provided in another section. Economic data inputs include cost of capital,
the economic life of the reactor, and the time to construct. These shall be determined by the
builder as best guess estimates based on current conditions. The financial inputs used in the
reference model are based on the Nuclear Energy Institute's 2008 predictions shown in Table 3.5
[Nuclear Energy Institute, August 2008]. A notable financial input missing in the G4-ECONS
model is the applicable tax rate. Therefore, all monetary outputs in this thesis will be provided
without the effects of taxes.
Table 3.5 - Generic Inputs for G4-ECONS model*
Reactor Plant Description 2-block ALMR
Year Adjust 1
Hours in a Day 24
Days in a Year 365
Site Size (Acres) n/a
Site Size (Hectares) n/a
Reactor Net Electrical Capacity 1244
Reactor Average Capacity Factor over Life 85%
Thermodynamic Efficiency (net) 37%
Plant Economic and Operational Life 40 years
Years to Construct 6 years
Cost per Acre for land n/a
Average craft labor rate n/a
Cost of Capital 11.04%
*Based on the ALMR as described in Table 3.6
For the Sodium Fast Reactor, the desired application is electricity production, and therefore the
main economic concerns are the total capital cost and the electricity cost once operational. The
capital costs are expressed as $/kwe and the LUEC is expressed as mills/kw-hr. The most useful
part of the G4-ECONS model is that these outputs are quickly produced as the inputs are
changed. Therefore, depending on the level of input detail, quick sensitivity analyses can be
performed by adjusting the input parameters.
3.3.2 Levelized Unit Electricity Cost
The ultimate goal of economizing the Sodium Fast Reactor is to reduce the cost of producing
electricity to levels comparable with light water reactors. By achieving similar levels of
electricity production cost, the SFR may be a desirable choice by utilities for the next generation
of nuclear power reactors. Using the G4-ECONS model, the LUEC is made up of four parts:
1. Annualized Capital Cost, including financing
2. Operations and Maintenance
3. Fuel Cycle
4. Decommissioning and Decontamination
The annual Fuel Cycle and Operation and Maintenance inputs to the LUEC are straight-forward:
the total annualized cost divided by the total electricity generated in one year.
The Decommissioning and Decontamination input to the LUEC is an annual contribution to a
sinking fund, with a goal amount to be accumulated over the operating life of the plant. This
goal amount is given as 33% of the direct capital costs [GIF, 2008]. The total annual amount is
then divided by the total electricity production for one year. For the ALMR model with a direct
capital cost of $1906 million, this will be $635 million dollars at the end of life.
The Annualized Capital Cost is the annual payment that must be made against the initial
construction loans. This figure includes the initial overnight capital costs, the interest during
construction, and the interest accrued over the operational period. This annual figure is divided
by the total electricity production for one year. The total electricity production is calculated
using the thermal power, efficiency and capacity factors given for the reactor [GIF, 2007]. These
values are calculated by the G4-ECONS model using the cost inputs provided by the user.
The values of each of these will be determined for the SFR and will be shown in Table 3.8 later
in this chapter.
3.3.3 Description of the ALMR
In order to provide a context for the cost figures that follow, the ALMR reference reactor is
described below. The ALMR is an SFR design developed by General Electric based on the
Integral Fast Reactor Technology. An ALMR plant utilizes modular reactor modules arranged
into reactor blocks, each comprised of two 840 MWt pool-type sodium fast reactors producing
622 MWe [Gluekler, 1997]. The performance data is given in Table 3.6. A basic diagram of the
nuclear island for the reference pool-type SFR model is shown in Figure 3.1 [Gokcek et al,
1995]. Each block of the plant would have two reactors and steam generator sets such as these.
Table 3.6 - ALMR Performance Data
No. of Reactors/Power Block 2
No. of Power Blocks 2
Thermal Reactor Power 3360 MWt
Electrical Power for 2 Power Blocks 1244 MWe
Net Station Efficiency 37%
Plant Capacity Factor 85%
Steam Conditions (Superheat) 15.16 MPa/430 C
Primary Sodium Inlet/Outlet Temp 360/500 C
Secondary Sodium Inlet/Outlet Temp 327/477 C
Metal (U-0.23Pu-
Fuel 0. lZr)
Average Fuel Burnup 106 MWd/kg
Average Fuel Linear Power,
BOL/EOL 20/18 W/mm
Refueling Interval 24 months
Containment Leak Rate <1% (7 kPa, 20 C)
Figure 3.1 - Pool-Type SFR Nuclear Island Diagram
IHTS EM PUMP (2)
STEAM GENERATOR
RIVACS INLET &
EXHAUST STACK
IHTS ISOLATION
.# .VALVES
EM
PUMP
TRANS-
FORMERS
SWRPRS
SEPARATOR
TANK
CONTAINMENT
SODIUM DOME
DUMPRECO
TANK MOFR SEISMIC3 RLATION
BEARING
Pigure 3-3 REACTOR & STEAM GENERATOR FACIUTY GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
ELECTRfCAL
EQU[PMENT
MODULES
U 2-. .,
3.4 Results from Reference Model
3.4.1 LUEC using the ALMR estimated costs
The information presented in the "1994 Capital and Busbar Cost Estimate" for an Nth-of-a-kind
(NOAK) ALMR were input to the G4-ECONS model [Gokcek et al, 1995]. These high level
inputs on the Code of Account level are shown in Table 3.7. More detailed data was used in the
actual model (see Appendix A). With this information and the G4-ECONS model, the results in
Table 3.8 are obtained. As stated earlier, these values do not take into account the effects of
taxes.
Table 3.7 - ALMR Inputs to G4-ECONS (2007$)
COA Category Description ($M)
Reactor Net Electrical Capacity 1,244 MWe
Reactor Average Capacity Factor over Life 85%
Thermodynamic Efficiency (net) 37%
Plant Economic and Operational Life 40 years
11 Land and land rights 23.855
21 Buildings, Structures, & Improvements on Site 358.80
22 Reactor Plant equipment 908.69
23 Turbine/Generator Plant equipment 241.94
24 Electrical equipment 130.28
25 Water intake and heat rejection plant 39.50
26 Miscellaneous plant equipment 53.22
31 Design Services at A/E Offices 99.10
33 Design services at plant site 121.32
35 Construction supervision at plant site 218.78
TOTAL FOR SERVICES (31-35) 439.20
46 Other Owners' capital investment costs 318.69
Contingency value in $M 384.38
FOVERNIGHT TOTAL 2898.55
Table 3.8 - Unadjusted LUEC Results using ALMR numbers
Total Annual Cost Mills/kw-hr Mills/kw-hr
(1994M$/yr) (1994$) (2007$)*
Capital Cost w/ fmancing** 70.07 35.47 51.21
Operations and Maintenance 46.60 7.82 11.82
Fuel Cycle 49.25 10.63 15.14
D&D 1.68 0.36 0.47
TOTAL 167.60 54.28 78.64
*Scaled using a factors from the Cost Estimating Guidelines: Capital Cost - 1.444, O&M - 1.512, Fuel - 1.425,
D&D - 1.305
**Financing costs using inputs: cost of capital - 11.04%, economic life - 40 years, construction -6 years
3.4.2 Capital cost of Sodium Fast Reactors compared to modern LWR
If Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors are to be introduced in the United States, their cost of electricity
must be equal or lower than comparable alternatives. In this case, these alternatives would be
light water reactors. There have been recent estimates for the cost of LWRs that can be used for
comparison, including five estimates evaluated in the 2008 MIT study, "Update on the Cost of
Nuclear Power" shown on Table 3.9 below [Du and Parsons, 2008]. As can be seen, the
overnight capital cost of new proposed light water reactors ranges from a low of $3500/kwe to
over $4700/kwe in 2007$. These numbers offer significant doubts in the estimates of SFR costs
presented by developers.
Table 3.9 - Overnight Costs for Some Proposed Nuclear Plants [Du and Parsons, 2008]
Owner
[A]
FPL
Progress Energy
SCEG/Santee-Cooper
Southern
NRG
Name of Plant
[]
Turkey Point 5 & 6
Levy County 1 & 2
V.C. Summer 2 & 3
Plant Vogtle 2 units
South Texas 3 & 4
Projected
Commercial
Design Capacity Operation Date
MW
(C] [D] [E]
ESBWR
AP1000
AP1000
AP1000
ABWR
3,040
2,212
2,234
2,200
2,700
2018-2020
2016-2017
2016-2019
2016-2017
2014-2015
Ovemight Cost
US 2007
$/kW
[F]
3,530
4,206
3,787
4,745
3,480
From Du and Parsons, CEEPR Working Paper 09-004.
There is much debate over the capital cost of a Sodium Fast Reactor relative to the present-day
cost of a light water reactor. Table 3.10 below shows some dated comparative studies on the
relative costs of SFRs and LWRs. Most predictions indicate that total capital cost for an SFR
plant is greater than that for a similar LWR plant.
Table 3.10 -Relative Cost by Country
Unit Capital Cost
Country Relative to LWR
France2  1.26
Great Britain3  1.1
Russia4 1.3
Germany3 1.16
3.4.3 Capital cost of ALMR compared to modern LWR
To provide a relative means of comparison of LWRs and SFRs, the G4-ECONS model provides
a benchmark LWR model described as a Gen III+ PWR, with a rated electrical capacity of 1300
kwe. This benchmark model has a complete set of cost data, broken down to the COA level of
detail [GIF, 2008]. A more modern source of LWR capital cost data is the 2005 TVA
Cost/Schedule/COL Project Proposal for its Bellefonte Site. The proposed project at Bellefonte
is a two-unit addition, 1,371 kwe per unit [Toshiba, 2005].
For ease of comparison, the Nth-of-a-Kind cost data for a 2-block ALMR was selected from the
ALMR report, and then costs were scaled up from 1994$ to 2007$ using the factors of inflation
provided in the G4 Guidelines. The Bellefonte costs were halved to simulate a 1-unit model, and
these costs were scaled from 2004$ to 2007$. In this way, all reactor models in the comparison
were rated for about 1300 kwe.
The first comparison is between the benchmark LWR provided in the G4ECONS model and the
Bellefonte estimate, shown in Table 3.11. This was to confirm the reliability of the benchmark
LWR data provided in the G4-ECONS model. Since the Bellefonte units are proposed as
2 M. Rapin. Fast Breeder Reactor Economics. Royal Society Discussion Meeting, London, UK. 1989
3 Troyanov, M.F. et al. "In Current Conditions, is it more expensive to build fast reactors than thermal
reactors?" Atomic Energy. Vol. 78, No. 1 1995
4 Poplavskii, et al. "BN-800 as a New Stage in the Development of Fast Sodium-Cooled Reactors."
Atomic Energy. Vol. 96, No. 6 2004
additional reactors on an existing site, certain categories will be lower, such as Land and Land
Rights (COA 11), Buildings, Structures and Improvements (COA 21) and Water Intake and Heat
Rejection Plant (COA 25). Many of these facilities already exist and will only require additions
made to accommodate the new units. Thus these areas should be disregarded in the comparison.
This table shows that the G4-ECONS standard model for LWRs is quite acceptable compared to
current cost estimates. In all other areas, with the exception of the Turbine Equipment, the costs
are similar, with the Bellefonte Plant costs exceeding by 10-20%. This difference is most likely
due to an increase in costs at a pace exceeding inflation, reflected by the higher cost of the
Bellefonte estimate. These similar categories are bolded in Table 3.11. The consistency of these
overnight capital cost results bolsters the reliability of the cost estimation methods used by the
GIF modeling group.
Table 3.11 - Comparison of Benchmark L WR and Bellefonte L WR (2007$)
Reference LWR Bellefonte
COA Case Description in G4ECONS 1-unit
Reactor Net Electrical Capacity 1,300 1,371
Reactor Average Capacity Factor over Life 90% 90%
Thermodynamic Efficiency (net) 33% 33%
Plant Economic and Operational Life 40 40
11 Land and land rights 6.000 0
21 Buildings, Structures, & Improvements on Site 440.18 294.84
22 Reactor Plant equipment 454.09 498.23
23 Turbine/Generator Plant equipment 430.82 335.37
24 Electrical equipment 125.58 151.28
25 Water intake and heat rejection plant 91.39 21.00
26 Miscellaneous plant equipment 82.42 79.17
31-35 Total Construction Services 615.29 592.21
46 Other Owners' capital investment costs 312.65 375.26
Contingency value in $M 382.85 536.07
OVERNIGHT TOTAL 2941.270 2873.43
In order to determine the relative validity of the ALMR capital costs, a direct comparison can
now be performed with some confidence. For a simplified explanation, only the comparison
between the benchmark PWR and the ALMR model will be discussed. Most capital costs are
difficult to directly compare without a much more detailed cost breakdown, since these costs are
very dependent on the reactor design. The design of an SFR is very different from that of a
PWR, so a comparison of these design specific costs would yield no useful insight into their
relative accuracy.
However, two main categories in the COA breakdown should be design independent: Electrical
Equipment (COA 24) and Other Owner's Capital Investment Cost (COA 46). The Electrical
Equipment category includes all switchgear, transformers, protective systems, and other on-site
electrical necessities. These costs should be solely dependent on the electrical capacity of the
facility, thus independent of reactor design. The Other Owner's Capital Investment Cost
includes the general infrastructure required such as roads, railways, administrative buildings,
transmission lines and other costs that are non-reactor specific [Nuclear Energy Institute, August
2008]. These should also be independent of reactor design. The direct comparison of capital
costs is presented in Table 3.12. In comparison, these two categories are consistent between the
ALMR and the benchmark LWR; both values are within 2% of each other. This supports the
consistency of estimation methods used by both economic modeling groups, indicating that there
may be relative accuracy between the two sets of data.
Table 3.12 - Direct Comparison of Capital Costs for LWR and SFR (2007$)
Reference 2-Block
COA Case Description LWR ALMR
Reactor Net Electrical Capacity (MWe) 1,300 1,288
Reactor Average Capacity Factor over Life 90% 85%
Thermodynamic Efficiency (net) 33% 37%
Plant Economic and Operational Life (years) 40 40
11 Land and land rights 6.000 23.855
Buildings, Structures, & Improvements on
21 Site 440.18 358.80
22 Reactor Plant equipment 454.09 908.69
23 Turbine/Generator Plant equipment 430.82 241.94
24 Electrical equipment 125.58 130.28
25 Water intake and heat rejection plant 91.39 39.50
26 Miscellaneous plant equipment 82.42 53.22
31 Design Services at A/E Offices 96.59 99.10
33 Design services at plant site 139.88 121.32
35 Construction supervision at plant site 378.82 218.78
TOTAL FOR SERVICES (31-35) 615.29 439.20
46 Other Owners' capital investment costs 312.65 318.69
Contingency value in $M 382.85 384.38
OVERNIGHT TOTAL 2941.27 2898.55
Total Capital Cost (with financing) $/kwe 3215.43 3311.43
*Financing costs using inputs: cost of capital - 11.04%, economic life - 40 years, construction - 6 years
In comparing the other components of the total capital cost, there are large differences in the
accounts for Buildings, Structures & Improvements (COA 21), Reactor Plant Equipment (COA
22) and Construction Supervision at Plant Site (COA 35). The Reactor Plant cost for the ALMR
is double that of the LWR. The reactor plant and internals of an SFR are much more complex
than an LWR, so this premium is expected. Four areas that have been identified to drive this cost
premium are the complexity of the automatic control systems, the number of heat-transfer loops
required to allow for passive safety measures, the need for an intermediate loop to prevent a
primary sodium and water reaction, and the use of sodium instead of water [Troyanov et al,
1995].
There are several categories of the LWR that are more expensive than the SFR. The Buildings
and Structures cost for the LWR exceeds the SFR by almost 25%. This can be attributed to the
cost of the large, concrete and steel containment required for an LWR that is not included in the
design for an ALMR. Finally, the Construction Supervision at Plant Site costs for the LWR are
almost 75% more than those for the SFR. This is because of the modular, in-factory construction
of the ALMR units that leads to a much simpler construction process on-site [Boardman, 2001].
An LWR has the majority of construction occur on-site.
The only major discrepancy among the three different sets of data is the Turbine/Generator Plant
Equipment (COA 23). This category should be relatively similar from one design to the next,
since the Rankine cycle remains the same regardless of the core design providing the heat. The
other categories that make up direct capital cost, Heat Rejection and Miscellaneous Equipment
(COA 25 and 26), should also be relatively similar between the two designs. It is not clear why
the ALMR has assumed such a low value for the turbine generator compared to the LWR.
Therefore, for the sake of consistency in the economic model, the ALMR values were replaced
with those of the reference PWR in the bolded accounts shown in Table 3.13. This raised the
overnight total to a value of $3140.84 M, which resulted in a total capital cost of $3460/kwe.
This value accounts for the financing costs, which is determined using the user inputs: 11% cost
of capital, 40 years economic life and 6 years of construction.
Table 3.13 - Modified Comparison of Capital Costs (2007$) *
Reference 2-Block
COA Case Description LWR ALMR
Reactor Net Electrical Capacity (MWe) 1,300 1,288
Reactor Average Capacity Factor over Life 90% 85%
Thermodynamic Efficiency (net) 33% 37%
Plant Economic and Operational Life (years) 40 40
11 Land and land rights 6.000 6.000
Buildings, Structures, & Improvements on
21 Site 440.18 358.80
22 Reactor Plant equipment 454.09 908.69
23 Turbine/Generator Plant equipment 430.82 430.82
24 Electrical equipment 125.58 125.58
25 Water intake and heat rejection plant 91.39 91.39
26 Miscellaneous plant equipment 82.42 82.42
31 Design Services at A/E Offices 96.59 99.10
33 Design services at plant site 139.88 121.32
35 Construction supervision at plant site 378.82 218.78
46 Other Owners' capital investment costs 312.65 312.65
Contingency value in $M 382.85 382.85
OVERNIGHT TOTAL 2941.27 3140.84
Total Capital Cost (with financing) $/kWe 3215.43 3459.86
*Bolded Categories were equalized for consistency
**Financing costs using inputs: cost of capital - 11.04%, economic life - 40 years, construction 
-6 years
When these estimates are compared to the overnight costs from the MIT Study shown in Table
3.9, the following summary in Table 3.14 is presented for evaluation:
Table 3.14 - MIT Study L WR Cost Estimates (2007$)
Owner Plant Capital Cost $/kwe
TVA Bellefonte 2,930
FPL Turkey Point 3,530
Progress Energy Levy County 4,206
SCEG VC Summer 3,787
Southern Plant Vogtle 4,745
Sodium Fast Reactor ALMR 3,140
It is quite clear that despite the additional complexities of the sodium cooled fast reactor,
developers believe that the capital cost could be lower than the level of modern LWRs. The MIT
updated economic study determined that the expected future cost of LWRs should be about
$4000/kwe. These results are shown on the Table 3.15 below which compares other electricity
generating alternatives with and without a carbon charge and variations in cost of capital [Du and
Parsons, 2008].
Table 3.15 - Expected Future Cost by Fuel Type [Du and Parsons, 20081
Update
$2007
LCOE
Ovemight w/ Carbon w/ same
Cost Fuel Cost Base Case Charge cost of$25/tCO2 capital
S/kW $/mmBtu $/kWh $/kWh #/kWh
Nuclear
Coal
Gas
4,000
2,400
900
0.67
2.60
7.00
8.4
6.2
6.5
8.3
7.4
6.6
From Du and Parsons, CEEPR Working Paper 09-004.
3.4.4 Adjusted Total Capital Cost and LUEC
Based on the results of the MIT study, the two sets of capital costs were scaled up by a factor of
1.244 so that the LWR capital costs with financing would be equal to $4000/kwe. This same
scaling factor increased the ALMR capital cost to 4304 $/kwe. Using these scaled figures, the
adjusted LUEC increased due to the increased capital cost, to 75.56 mills/kw-hr for the
benchmark LWR and 92.34 mills/kw-hr for the SFR. The results of this escalation are shown in
Table 3.16.
Table 3.16 - Adjusted LUECfor LWR and ALMR compared to NERA Proportions of
Generating Cost (2007$)
LWR ALMR NERA
Mills/kw-hr Mills/kw-hr Proportions of
Generating Cost
Capital Cost w/ fmancing 56.87 (75.3%) 64.79 (70.2%) 60-75%
Operations and
Maintenance 9.35 (12.4%) 11.93 (12.9%) 8-15%
Fuel Cycle* 9.07 (12.0%) 15.15 (16.4%) 5-10%
D&D 0.28 (0.4%) 0.47 (0.5%) 0-5%
Total LUEC 75.56 92.34
Total Capital Cost $4000/kwe $4304/kwe
* LWR Fuel Cycle is based on once-through cycle, ALMR fuel cycle is based on steady-state recycling facility
Within the NEI's document entitled, "The Cost of New Generating Capacity in Perspective",
current nuclear power generating costs are in the range of 83.40 mills/kw-hr [Nuclear Energy
Institute, 2009]. The results from the G4-ECONS model analysis for LWRs fall within this
range. Also, each of the values as a percentage of total electricity cost nearly falls within the
ranges expected by the NERA Economic Consulting Group's "Proportions of Generating Cost"
[NERA, 2006]. This agreement further enforces the level of comparable reliability in these
numbers.
These results show that the capital cost of the ALMR versus the LWR is not the only contributor
that results in higher generation costs. Instead, the ALMR exhibits a higher cost in each of the
four categories that make up the LUEC. The net effect is that given these assumptions, the
levelized cost of power is 22% more expensive than LWRs with 14% higher cost for the capital
portion of the plant.
3.5 Limitations of a Reference Model
While the use of a reference model can enable an analyst to draw conclusions and determine
economic trends, the reference model has limitations that must also be realized. The biggest
limitation that must be remembered is that the results produced are only as reliable as the data
that is input into the model. Care must be taken to obtain as reliable values as possible for the
input data, or it must be noted that the results can only be reliable to such a level. This reference
model uses the capital cost values for the ALMR, scaled from 1994$ to 2007$. The values have
also been scaled to closely mimic the known increases in LWR costs over that same period.
Although several checks have been performed to confirm the reliability of these capital costs, it
must be acknowledged that absolute conclusions should not be made based on these values.
However, this model should be a satisfactory tool to make comparative judgments based on
possible design changes to reactors of similar design.
There are other variables besides capital cost that are difficult to predict at the incipience of
development of this new technology:
* Fuel Cycle Information at Steady State
" Capacity Factor for Nth of a Kind (NOAK) Reactor
* Risk-Premium and Corresponding Cost of Capital
These variables will have a large impact on the LUEC, since these are major contributors to the
calculations. Based on initial estimates, the fuel cycle component can make up anywhere from
10-20% of the overall levelized electricity cost [Gokcek et al, 2005]. The deployment of SFR
technology would require the development of new fuel cycle facilities, and the estimates of these
costs have very large uncertainties at this point. The capacity factor is also a large unknown. The
assumption of 85% is used in developing the reference model may be too low for an advanced
SFR which would significantly alter the economics. For example, a 5% increase in capacity
factor lowers the cost of electricity by almost 6%. Modern-day light water reactors have
achieved capacity factors of over 90%, but it had taken many years to get to this level of
performance [Energy Information Administration, 2008]. See Figure 3.2 below for the capacity
factor of US Nuclear Power Plants from 1973-2007.
Figure 3.2 - US Nuclear Power Plant Capacity Factor (1973-2007)
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It is unknown whether or not Sodium Fast Reactors will require a similar learning curve to
achieve capacity factors at levels as high as LWRs. If lessons learned from the LWR program
can be applied to speed the development of the SFR program, these levels may be achieved more
quickly. A sensitivity of the LUEC versus Capacity Factor is shown in Table 3.17.
Table 3.17 - LUEC with various Capacity Factors
Capacity Factor LUEC (mills/kw-hr)
50% 156.98
60% 130.81
70% 112.13
80% 98.11
85 % 92.34
90% 87.21
As can be seen in the table, even if a competitive level of electricity generation is reached for an
assumed capacity factor, any loss of capacity will quickly balloon those costs to much higher
levels. However, it is believed that the prior issues that have plagued SFRs, such as sodium
leaks and low reliabilities, will no longer be a problem with the advancements in these
technologies that have occurred. Whether this can be realized is not known at this time.
The cost of capital is another area that will be difficult to determine without a serious effort and
detailed understanding of the current economic conditions. This expected rate of return to
investors will require a risk premium, and this premium will vary depending on the perceived
risk of their investment. Considering an NOAK reactor, the cost of capital for an SFR should be
similar to that of an LWR. The financing structure will also be heavily dependent on who is
constructing the plant, whether it is built as part of a regulated entity or as an unregulated plant
[Nuclear Energy Institute, February 2009].
3.6 Uses of the Reference Model to Make More Economical
3.6.1 Possible ways to reduce LUEC
Based on the results from the G4-ECONS model, there are five possible ways to reduce the
LUEC, thus making the Sodium Fast Reactor more economically competitive.
1. Reduce Capital Cost
2. Reduce Operations and Maintenance Costs
3. Reduce Fuel Cycle Costs
4. Increase Capacity Factor
5. Increase Efficiency
Utilizing these five possible changes, each affects the LUEC in a different way due to their
importance in the calculation. The first three changes affect the inputs to the annual cost, with
the capital cost input as the largest contribution. The final two changes will affect the amount of
electricity produced annually, with higher energy production leading to lower unit prices.
Therefore, as an example of their effects on the LUEC, Table 3.18 shows the required change to
lower the LUEC of the ALMR by 5%.
Table 3.18 - Changes Required to Lower LUEC 5%
Capital Cost Reduce by 7.4%
O&M Reduce by 37.8%
Fuel Cycle Reduce by 32.9%
Capacity Factor Increase by 4.5% to 89.5%
Efficiency Increase by 2% to 39%
As these results show, the most effective ways to reduce the LUEC cost for the SFR is to target
the capital cost, the efficiency or the capacity. Any reduction in fuel cycle cost or O&M cost is
less effective in reducing the overall generation cost, as major savings must be realized to result
in similar reductions.
In order to quantify the economic impact of any change proposed, the effects of such a change on
any of these five categories must be determined. Using the G4-ECONS model with the detailed
inputs for the ALMR, the overall effect on the LUEC and Total Capital Cost can be realized
quickly.
3.7 Summary
With the G4-ECONS model, the reference model was developed for the Sodium-Cooled Fast
Reactor. These values were compared to several modern cost estimates of LWRs to confirm
relative reliability of the costs. A relative comparison of the costs of the SFR and the benchmark
LWR was then developed, as shown in Table 3.19. Using the model, possible methods of
reducing the cost of electricity were identified, with reducing capital cost and increasing
efficiency being two of the most effective options.
Table 3.19 - Summary of Economic Comparison (2007$)
Benchmark LWR SFR
Total Capital Cost $4,000/kwe $4304/kwe
LUEC 75.56 mills/kw-hr 92.34 mills/kw-hr
SFR relative to LWR -+ 22.2%
Chapter 4 - Demonstration of Methodology through Case Studies
4.1 Case Studies to Demonstrate Methodology
Several case studies were performed using the methodology described in an effort to reduce the
cost of the Sodium Fast Reactor. Due to the limitations of available data, these case studies were
selected to show the potential of this methodology in both probabilistic and deterministic
situations, using the ALMIR as the reference design to evaluate certain design alternative. The
case studies considered are:
1. Removing energetic core disruptive accidents from licensing basis events
a. Removal or simplification of structures and equipment
b. Raising the core outlet temperature to increase thermal efficiency
2. Evaluation of alternative power conversion cycles
3. Assessing whether the steam generator can be manufactured as non-safety grade to
reduce its cost
4. Eliminating unnecessary safety equipment on a risk basis such as the excess number of
control rods
In this chapter, the economic benefit of each of the design alternatives will be presented in terms
of savings in the cost of electricity (LUEC). The assumptions for the calculation of the LUEC
are the same as those developed in Chapter 3, and will be based on the ALMR economic data
presented in Appendix A.
4.2 Case Study 1 - Removing Energetic Core Disruptive Accidents from Licensing
Basis Events
One major class of accidents covered within the PRA is the Energetic Core Disruptive Accident
(ECDA). This class describes all accidents that result in the energetic removal of fuel material
from its designated position in the core. These accidents have been a major issue in previous
licensing discussions, as there has been serious concern over the possible consequences. These
accident types do have the potential for serious consequences if they were to occur, but it can be
shown that they are also extremely unlikely when analyzed using a risk-based approach to safety.
As previously described in Chapter 2, the TNF describes the process for determining
Probabilistic Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) and the licensing requirements. The TNF also
describes the method through which sequences can be screened from consideration. If the mean
frequency of the sequence is lower than 10~8 per year, the event can be screened from
consideration. This screening method is the major difference between the deterministic and
probabilistic approach to licensing within the TNF, and it may allow for major savings in the
SFR design.
4.2.1 Possible Dose from ECDA
If the ECDA cannot be screened below the threshold, it must comply by the standards for LBEs.
Therefore, if the frequency does not fall below 10~8, the dose resulting from this event must be
less than the corresponding limit imposed by the stairstep curve in Figure 2.2. From this curve,
the highest limit for dose corresponds with events having frequencies as low as 10-7, which is
500 rem. Therefore, if the dose is higher than 500 rem, it cannot be licensable unless the point
estimate of the frequency is pushed below the 10~8 level to be screened from consideration.
Using Generic Accident Progression methods based on several SFR PRAs and collections of
event trees, the Generic Release categories were developed to group potential accidents by their
potential consequences. This method is extremely valuable for the evaluation of accidents using
the TNF as a guide, since it can immediately illuminate which sequences will have large
potential consequences. The 12 release categories are described and the potential doses listed in
Table 4.1 [Denning, 2009].
Table 4.1 - Generic Release Categories for ALMR
elease RDose (rem) at One Mile
CategoryRelease CharacteristicsCategory 5th Median 9 5 th
Large Release of contaminated sodium to
1 containment. Containment intact other than design 2.5E-4 2.5E-2 0.25
leakage
Small release of contaminated sodium to
2 containment. Containment intact other than design 2.5E-6 2.5E-4 2.5E-3
leakage
3 Large release of contaminated sodium to 4.3E-2 4.3 430
containment. Containment open
4 Small release of contaminated sodium to 4.3E-4 4.3E-2 0.43
containment. Containment open
5 Substantial fuel melting. Pool scrubbing. Primary 0.2 1.3 2.3
system intact or containment intact
6 Minor fuel melting. Pool scrubbing. Primary system 2.OE-2 0.13 0.23intact or containment intact
7 Substantial fuel melting. Pool scrubbing. Primary 77 47 810
system and containment failed
8 Minor fuel melting. Pool scrubbing. Primary system 7.7 47 81
and containment failed
9 Fuel melting. Energetic event. Limited pool 2.7 12 100
scrubbing. Primary system failed. Containment intact 2
Fuel melting. Energetic event. Limited pool
10 scrubbing. Primary system failed. Early containment 790 2,000 11,000
failure
I Failed primary system. Core uncover. Oxidizing 1.4 11 110environment. Containment intact.
Failed primary system (includes failure of vessel and
12 guard vessel by molten fuel). Core uncover. 160 1,100 11,000
Oxidizing environment. Containment failed. I II __
The important value to note in this table is the 9 5th percentile dose at one mile. This dose must
be less than 500 rem unless the mean estimate of the frequency of the corresponding event can
be pushed below the 10- threshold. Therefore, the release categories of interest for this analysis
are #7, 10 and 12. According to their descriptions within the table, each of these events represent
situations where there is core damage and the containment is assumed to have failed.
4.2.2 Establishing the Frequency of ECDA
Within the TNF, there is a deterministic requirement that all core damage events must be less
frequent than 10- per reactor year. However, in order to gain economic benefit by not designing
for these accidents, the mean estimate of this frequency must be shown to be less frequent than
10-7 per reactor year. The dominant sequence that results in the energetic scenario from the PRA
is Loss of Heat Removal during a shutdown transient. The progression of this scenario leads to
eventual sodium boiling and a recriticality of the core with a late energetic expulsion. This event
results in a release of 11,000 rem for the 9 5th percentile release. This sequence is shown in the
event tree in Figure 4.1 [Johnson, 2009]. However, the point estimate frequency of this sequence
is 1.30 x 10-8, which is below the threshold for screening. In addition, all unprotected events are
screened from consideration due to the highly reliable scram system, with a failure probability on
the order of 10-6. The level of assurance on the scram system helps to push all related sequences
well below the screening limit [Apostolakis and Johnson, 2009].
Figure 4.1- Event Tree Showing Dominant Sequence
4.2.3 Economic Benefit of Not Designing for ECDA
By not considering the ECDA events as the basis of the design requirements, several
simplifications can be made and justified with the TNF approach to safety. To determine the
economic gain from eliminating the ECDA as a design basis accident, the ABR-1000 has been
designed to meet the requirements in the existing licensing framework, codified in 10 CFR Part
50, which tends to use the more deterministic method of identifying design basis accidents.
These accident scenarios have required additional redundant safety features [Grandy and
Seidensticker, 2007]. The ABR-1000 has three redundant decay heat removal loops and two
independent safety-grade scram systems in addition to an ultimate scram system included in its
design. It also has a much larger and more robust reactor containment building. These
additional systems and structures can add significant capital cost, increasing the LUEC
Even though the design of the ALMR and S-PRISM were not done using the TNF approach, the
designers chose to eliminate the ECDA as a design basis event. Thus the designs of the ALMR
and S-PRISM already take these simplifications into account, including the use of only one
scram system, one decay heat removal system, and the simplified containment structure. These
design alternatives can result in significant economic savings, but they may not be allowed by
the deterministic approach to licensing, with its requirements for defense in depth and
redundancy in safety systems
Thus comparing the costs of these systems in the ABR-1000 with those of the ALMR, now
justified by the TNF methodology, one can make an estimate of the cost savings for these
simplifications. The following sections give examples of the analysis used to estimate savings
since no data on this level of detail is provided for the ABR-1000, ALMR or S-PRISM. .
An additional benefit of not designing for the ECDA events is a possible increase in the core
outlet temperature to take advantage of available thermal margins. This will allow the reactor to
operate at a higher efficiency, thus decreasing costs. The benefits of increasing the temperature
will be discussed in the following section on increasing efficiency.
4.2.4 Cost of Traditional Containment
A traditional dome-shaped concrete containment such as those on modern LWR plants is an
extremely expensive structural component. According to the estimates used in the G4-ECONS
reference LWR, the containment dome cost makes up over 5% of the total overnight cost of the
plant. In the development of the Sodium Fast Reactor, there have been varying opinions on
whether or not a comparatively robust containment design would be required. The Japanese
support the effort to use a simplified and less robust non-traditional containment, stressing that
the main design concern must be focused on radionuclide confinement rather than pressure
resistance due to the relatively low pressure of the primary system compared to LWRs. The
Japanese have also determined that ECDA is a highly improbable event, and therefore the
containment does not need to have the strength of a traditional containment [Shimakawa et al.,
2002].
If it is determined that the SFR will require a conventional containment, the containment will be
constructed to standards similar to those for the ABR-1000. However, if it is determined that a
smaller, rectangular containment can be used instead, a containment building similar to that of
the ALMR should be constructed.
In the ABR-1000, the reactor building is a conventional steel-lined reinforced concrete structure,
in the shape of a cylindrical base and a hemispherical dome. It was designed to be similar to that
of a traditional light water reactor, with sufficient room within the containment dome to perform
maintenance tasks required during the lifetime of the reactor. The entire nuclear island and
containment is seismically isolated to help protect against seismic events [Grandy and
Seidensticker, 2007].
Each of the two reactors in one block of the ALMR has a steel-lined upper containment structure
10 meters tall, with a width of 20 meters and a length of 22 meters. Located between the two
upper containments is a shared auxiliary service room, 8 meters tall, 9 meters wide and 34 meters
in length. This room contains the primary Na service and cover gas cleanup systems in addition
to the primary sodium storage tanks. This containment volume is a low leakage pressure
retaining steel-lined concrete room and it provides access to the components on the top of the
reactor vessel [Boardman, 2001]. The Nuclear Island is seismically isolated by a single,
seismically isolated platform holding the reactor, its safety equipment, the intermediate heat-
transport system, and the steam generator [Gluekler, 1997].
Each block of the ALMR consists of two reactors, and has a total power rating of 622 MWe.
Each reactor within the block is contained within its own rectangular containment. The design of
the ABR-1000 is based on a single smaller reactor, only producing 380 MWe. For a quick size
comparison, the containment around one reactor of the ALMR will be examined alongside the
dome-shaped containment of the ABR-1000 in Figure 4.2. The use of the containment of one
reactor is done only to attain a comparison where both designs will have comparable power
ratings. The reference ALMR is comprised of four reactors, two per block, and has a rated
power of 1244 MW, 622 MW per block.
Figure 4.2 - Relative Size of Containment - ABR-1000 vs. ALMR
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As can be seen in the figure, the traditional containment of the ABR-1000 is considerably larger
than that of the ALMR. The traditional containment is five times taller and has almost twice the
footprint. With such a considerable differential in size, the cost to construct the ABR-1000 will
definitely exceed that of the ALMR. In fact, the surface area of the two containments has a ratio
of almost 4 to 1, indicating that the traditional containment may require nearly four times the
building materials of concrete and steel to construct. The comparative dimensions are presented
in Table 4.2.
r
Table 4.2 - Containment Characteristics ABR-1000 vs. ALMR
ABR-1000 ALMR (1 reactor)
Electrical Power 370 MW 322 MW
Containment Dimensions 30.5 m diameter 20 m x 22 m
50.6 m tall 10 m tall
Footprint 772 m2  440 m2
Total Containment Surface Area 4845 m2  1280 m2
Maximum Leak Rate 0.1%/day @10 psig >1% /day @ 5 psig
Maximum Design Pressure 10 psig 5 psig
Seismic Isolation Entire Reactor Entire Reactor
Building Building
*Only 1 reactor building is used for this size comparison in order to show comparable power ratings
To evaluate the cost of the traditional containment versus the smaller containment of the ALMR,
the known cost of the AP1000 containment will be used as a reference along with the
comparative costs of the reference LWR and ALMR in the G4-ECONS model.
The most recent economic data available on the cost of a traditional containment comes from the
Westinghouse design for the AP1000 LWR reactors. According to the World Nuclear News,
these containments, which measure 36 meters in diameter and 65 meters in height, will be built
at a cost of $150 million [Industry Talk, 2008]. While a light water reactor containment will
need to be built much thicker and sturdier to withstand the higher design basis pressures than
required for an SFR, this provides a relative figure of an up-to-date cost of a traditional
containment. It would not be unrealistic for the ABR-1000 containment alone to still cost more
than $100 million.
The Code of Account (COA) 21 describes all costs involved with building structures and site
improvements during the construction. This includes the cost of all main, auxiliary and support
buildings, including the turbine buildings, steam generator buildings, warehouses, maintenance
shops and the reactor containment, with the reactor containment as the dominating cost in this
category. Without considering the type of containment that will be built, all costs in COA 21
should be the same, leaving the containment cost as the only major difference in this category
between a traditional LWR and the ALMR.
As can be seen in Table 4.3, the aggregate value of COA 21 is much more expensive for the
reference LWR with the traditional containment than for the ALMR with the smaller
containment. The difference between the reference LWR and the ALMR is over $81 million.
With the traditional containment built to the standards of the ABR-1000, the savings would still
be around $50-80 million. This is a reasonable amount to save based on the comparative sizes of
the two different containment types and the corresponding amounts of building materials
required.
Table 4.3 - COA 21 Comparison from G4-ECONS model
If the conclusion can be reached that the traditional containment is not necessary, this results in
no change to the existing reference model, since it already takes credit for this smaller
containment. However, the use of this smaller containment does present significant savings over
the use of the larger traditional one, as shown in Table 4.4. The difference in capital cost
between the two options results in a savings of 4.3%. These capital cost savings translate into a
1.6% reduction in the electricity cost.
Table 4.4 - Maximum Effect of Containment on LUEC
With ALMR %
Traditional Containment Change
Containment
(+$81M)
Direct Capital Cost 1988.33 M 1906.95 M -4.3%
(2007$) 1
LUEC (Mills/kw-hr) 93.87 92.34 -1.6%
2007$
Reference LWR (COA 21) $440.18 M
ALMR (COA 21) $358.80 M
Difference $ 81.38 M
ALMR Direct Capital Cost $ 1906.95 M
Percentage of ALMR Total 4.3%
Direct Capital Cost
4.2.5 Safety Issues with Containment
The removal of ECDA events from the possible LBEs is the main safety issue that allows for a
smaller and less rugged containment. As mentioned previously, release categories #7, 10, and 12
in Table 4.1 all describe events where there is core damage and the containment has failed.
According to the safety analysis, there are no probabilistic LBEs more frequent than the 10-8
threshold that pose a major threat to containment [Johnson and Denman, 2009].
There are other safety issues that may need to be addressed as well before this design alternative
can be approved. Some examples of these safety issues are the consideration of how the
containment would perform under certain Beyond Design Basis Events (BDBE) such as an
Aircraft Impact or a Large Sodium Spray or Pool Fire. According to investigations performed by
Argonne National Laboratory, the less rugged containment should be able to survive the impact
from a commercial aircraft, mainly due to the safety contributions of the seismic isolators
[Kulak, 2003]. In addition, GE Nuclear Energy Division has performed an assessment on the
robustness of the less rugged containment, and they have concluded that it can accommodate
large sodium spray and pool fires without producing containment pressures that may rupture
containment [Boardman, 2001].
4.2.6 Potential Savings from other Design Alternatives
If it can be shown that only one safety-grade decay heat removal system is required, such as
RVACS in the ALMR model, there may be savings possible. The ABR-1000 has three
independent and redundant heat removal loops and two independent safety-grade scram systems
in its design [Grandy and Seidensticker, 2007]. By the removal of two heat removal loops, there
may be the potential for minor savings on capital cost of the reactor. This savings will not have a
major impact on the overall LUEC, as the maximum potential benefit may be about $8.9 million,
less than 0.3% of the total direct capital cost. The simplification of the scram system may allow
for savings up to about $8.1 million [Gokcek et al, 1995]. A summary of these savings is shown
on Table 4.5 below. The total savings is estimated to be $17 million, reducing capital cost by
0.54 percent and reducing electricity cost by 0.31 percent.
Table 4.5- Total Savings from Removal or Simplification of Equipment
Total Savings % of Total Direct
from Change Capital Cost
Decay Heat Removal Loops $8.9 million 0.28%
Scram System Simplification $8.1 million 0.26%
TOTAL $17.0 million 0.54%
Effect on LUEC - 0.29 mills/kwe -0.31%
Although these savings are not significant, there is a significant value in using the TNF
methodology should this methodology be rigorously applied with actual cost information based
on specific designs of sodium cooled fast reactors.
4.2.7 Increasing Core Outlet Temperature
Increasing the Core Outlet Temperature may be the most effective design alternative that arises
from the removal of ECDA events from Licensing Basis. The current design temperature of
5 10 C is a result of conservatism in design because of the uncertainty of requirements, especially
those surrounding ECDA. Without the requirement to design for ECDA, these conservatisms
can be relaxed. The increased temperature allows the reactor to operate at a higher efficiency,
resulting in reduced electricity cost. The development of this design alternative through the
project methodology is shown in greater detail in Section 4.3.2, but the economic benefits of
raising the temperature can be seen in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 - Effect on LUEC by Raising Core Outlet Temperature
Cycle LUEC % Change
Efficiency (Mills/kw-hr)
Rankine Cycle at 510*C 37% 92.34 -
Rankine Cycle at 550 0C 38% 89.91 -2.43 (-2.6%)
4.2.8 Summary
The removal of Energetic Core Disruptive Accidents from Licensing Basis Events is an
important example of how this methodology can be used to reduce the cost of the SFR. By
demonstrating that these events have a frequency of less than 10-8/yr, they fall into a region that
is "screened out" under the TNF licensing process. Without the need to design for these
improbable accidents, the designer can have greater flexibility in choosing safety components,
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and may be able to reduce costs or enhance operating performance. The overall benefits of
designing without these events are shown in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 - Summary of Design Changes ($2007)
Option Direct Capital Capital Cost LUEC LUEC
Cost Reduction (mills/kw-hr) Reduction
($ million) ($ million) (mills/kw-hr)
No ECDA credit, large
containment and added $2005.33 - 93.87 -
safety features
Smaller containment and
removalof unneeded $1906.95 
-$99.38 92.34 - 1.53 (1.6%)
safety features
(ALMR design)
ALMR design operated
at increased temp $1906.95 -$99.38 89.91 - 3.96 (4.2%)
(550
0
C)
4.3 Case Study 2 - Possible Design Alternatives that may Improve Efficiency
In Chapter 3, the economic benefits of different design changes were discussed. One of the most
effective ways to reduce overall electricity cost was to target the efficiency of the reactor. Shown
on Table 4.8 are the effects of higher thermal efficiency on the Levelized Unit Electricity Cost.
The thermal power, capacity factor and the initial efficiency were each given in the reactor
specifications for the ALMR [Gokcek et al, 1994]. The total annualized cost and the LUEC were
calculated using the G4ECONS program and the economic inputs from the economic model. In
order to quantify the economic benefit of increasing overall efficiency, the total electrical power
and respective LUEC were calculated with an efficiency of 38% and 39%, representing a 1% or
2% increase in efficiency. With a higher efficiency, the reactor will produce more electricity as
reflected in the increase in electrical power. As a rough estimate, it can be said that each 1%
increase in efficiency will reduce the LUEC by about 2.5%.
Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.2 show how the efficiency can affect the LUEC for a given reactor
design. The overall efficiency of the reactor will affect the annual energy production, with an
increase in efficiency leading to an increase in kw-hr per year. The total annualized cost is an
output from the G4-ECONS model, and represents the total expenses (capital recovery, interest,
O&M, and fuel costs) for the plant each year. Therefore, as long as the total annualized cost
remains constant, the larger denominator in Equation 4.1 will lead to a reduced overall LUEC.
Equation 4.1 - Levelized Unit Electricity Cost
LUEC =
Total Annualized Cost
Annual Electricity Production
Equation 4.2 -Annual Electricity Production
Annual Electricity Prod.
= Thermal Power x Eff.x 24 hours/day x 365 days x Cap. Factor
Table 4.8 - Effects of Higher Efficiency on LUEC
ALMR Initial With 1% increase in With 2% increase in
Conditions Efficiency Efficiency
Thermal Power 1680 MWth 1680 MWth 1680 MWth
Capacity Factor 85% 85% 85%
Efficiency 37% 38% 39%
Electrical Power 1243 MWe 1277 MWe 1310 MWe
Total Annualized Cost $ 829.38 M/year $ 829.38 M/year $ 829.38 M/year
LUEC (mills/kwe) 92.34 89.46(-2.6%) 87.60 (-5.1%)
Most design alternatives will not only affect the efficiency, but also will require an economic
analysis of the capital cost changes or any effects on availability or capacity factor of the reactor.
Therefore, the complete economic analysis of these changes will present the possible economic
benefits along with the possible drawbacks.
4.3.1 Design Alternative - Increase Core Outlet Temperature
A design alternative that may increase efficiency is increasing the core outlet temperature. By
increasing the core outlet temperature, the overall efficiency of the cycle will increase. Previous
work has been done by Alexander Ludington to show potential increases in efficiency through
various design alternatives [Ludington, 2009].
Possible Safety Issues
Before any changes can be suggested to raise the core outlet temperature, it must be confirmed as
safe within the TNF model. To do this, the effect of raising the temperature must be assessed by
evaluating the impacts on fuel behavior, accident analysis and changes in frequencies of fuel
damage to be input into the PRA model. The area that will be affected is the increased
likelihood of the initiators that may lead to Core Disruptive Accidents due to the additional heat
in the core if an accident was to occur. As discussed in the Section 4.2.2, the analysis of ECDA
results in the probability of all sequences falling below the limit to be screened under the TNF.
Even if the probabilities of the initiators were increased due to the higher temperatures, there is
sufficient margin provided by the scram system that prevents the overall failure probabilities of
all unprotected events from rising above the 10-8 threshold. Higher temperatures raise the
frequency or consequence of some accident sequences that resulted in sodium boiling or minor
fuel pin damage, so these new frequencies must be confirmed. Any sequences that have risen
above the threshold into a region of consideration must not fall into the generic release categories
#3, 7, 10 or 12 as described in Table 4.1. This has been confirmed through work performed by
Matt Denman and Brian Johnson through core and fuel performance modeling as well as PRA
methods. Due to the number of sequences analyzed to confirm the safety analysis, the
conclusions have been summarized in Table 4.9. All unprotected events remain below the 108
threshold. All sequences that result in sodium boiling and fuel pin damage still resulted in no
release [Denman, Johnson and Nitta, 2009].
Table 4.9 - Results of Safety Analysis for 550C
Sequences Conclusions
All Unprotected Events Frequency remains below 10~8 threshold
Sodium Boiling All sequence end states acceptable, no release
Fuel Pin Damage All sequence end states acceptable, no release
Since the increase in core outlet temperature will be allowed according to the TNF safety criteria,
the feasibility of this design alternative will depend on the economic feasibility. The two
possible detrimental effects of the higher temperatures could be increased corrosion rate of the
primary loop materials or the failure of the fuel cladding. Typical experience originating from
light water reactors shows that an increase in temperature by only 5 to 10*C can double the rate
of corrosion, due to the corrosive environment created between the water and steel [Jones, 1991].
Fortunately, the material compatibility between sodium and stainless steels allows for extended
operation under most temperatures with little or no corrosion. "Our experience in
decommissioning EBR-I," says John Sackett, Argonne's deputy associate laboratory director for
Argonne-West, "shows that materials and components in the core can operate in liquid sodium
without significant damage or corrosion. We removed components from the sodium pool after 30
years and found them just as shiny as the day they went in. We saw original marks that welders
and other craftsmen had made 30 years earlier when they created the component."[Baurac, 2002]
Therefore, corrosion should not be a limiting factor even at higher temperatures.
It appears that the main restriction on higher operating temperatures will be the fuel and clad
material limits due to eutectic formation and burnup. With the use of metal fuel, such as in the
S-PRISM, the eutectic liquidus temperature is dependent on burnup, so an onset of eutectic
formation must be assumed to use as a baseline. With this temperature, the 2-sigma clad
temperature calculations must be performed to determine the core outlet temperature, while
keeping the hottest fuel pin below this maximum temperature [Denman, 2009].
Potential Core Outlet Temperature
The core outlet temperature can be increased by flattening the coolant temperature distribution
within the fuel assembly. Flattening can be achieved by placing vertical ribs on the inner wall of
the hexagonal assembly cans, which will reduce flow in the non-heated edge subchannels. This
design will create better mixing of the coolant within each assembly, allowing for a more even
temperature distribution across the channels. In this way, the average core outlet temperature
could be increased while maintaining the temperature of the hot channel within peak cladding
temperature limits. With ribs in place, it has been shown that the average core outlet temperature
can be increased almost 15 C without raising the cladding temperatures in the hottest channel
[Memmott, 2009]
Another potential method of flattening the temperature profile is through the use of TRU grading
or diluent grading to flatten the core power profile. This option is not as effective as it can
greatly affect the refueling cycle and can be difficult to control over a long period of burnup.
These drawbacks may result in a refueling cycle period that is too short to be economically
feasible [Denman, 2009].
These and other design options allow for a large range in core outlet temperatures for existing
SFRs. Some of these temperatures are listed in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10 - Core Outlet Temperatures of existing SFRs
Core Outlet
Temperature ('C)
ALMR (USA) [Gluekler, 1997] 500
ABR-1000 (USA) [Grandy, 2007] 510
JSFR (Japan) [Ichimiya, 2007] 550
EFR (Europe) [Pay, 2009] 545
BN-600 (Russia) [IAEA, 2007] 550
Based on the potential options and the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the fuel and
potential corrosion issues, the initiating event frequency should not change and the consequences
associate with the events modeled in the PRA suggest that an outlet temperature of 550*C is
possible for metallic fuel as well as oxide fuel. At this time, there has not been further analysis
on the economic benefits and tradeoffs for metallic and oxide fuel.
As previously shown in Table 4.8, the increase in temperature leads to increased efficiency and
ultimately lower electricity cost. As will be shown in the following section, the results of higher
temperatures are magnified even further if the use of the Supercritical CO 2 cycle can be adopted.
4.3.2 Design Alternative - Change Power Conversion System
Another design alternative identified and analyzed is the option to change the Power Conversion
System (PCS). One attractive option is to use the Supercritical CO 2 (SC0 2) cycle instead of the
traditional Rankine cycle.
From the safety standpoint for licensing under the Technology Neutral Framework, the type of
PCS will have little effect on any existing sequence. It is not considered a safety grade system,
and any mitigation or prevention benefits will have no effect on the safety case for licensing.
However, non-safety grade systems can affect the performance of the reactor during accident
sequences, and these potential effects must be analyzed. If an alternative power conversion
system is selected, the impact of this system must be analyzed to assess potential accident
scenarios that affect the core and radiation release. Replacing the steam with SCO 2 has some
advantages in that water is removed as a potential reactive agent. However, SCO 2 operates at
very high pressures, as high as 20 MPa [Hejzlar et al, 2006], and a failure of the intermediate
heat exchanger could introduce high pressure CO2 into the primary system, potentially
overpressurizing it and voiding the core. The likelihood and consequences of these events need
to be analyzed in the TNF framework to assess whether the safety goals are still met and whether
the economic benefits can be realized.
Economic Benefits of SCO 2
The economic benefits of using the Supercritical CO2 cycle instead of the Rankine cycle are
twofold: there is the potential for very large savings in capital cost due to the reduced size of the
turbomachinery and there may be the potential for operation at higher efficiency than with the
traditional Rankine cycle.
The potential for reduced capital cost stems from the large difference in size between the
components required for a Rankine cycle versus those required for a Brayton cycle. Based on
work performed for a previous study by Vaclav Dostal of MIT, a SCO 2 PCS may be as much as
six times smaller than a Rankine PCS with a comparable power rating. In COA 23 - Turbine
and Generator Plant Equipment, the SCO2 cycle cost was about one-third of the cost of the
Rankine Cycle [Dostal, et al, 2005]. This results in significant savings, as COA 23 is a $335
million (2007$) category. If the designer was able to reduce capital cost in this category by two-
thirds, it would be a saving of $223 million, almost 12% of the direct capital cost of the SFR.
The second potential economic benefit lies with the performance of the Supercritical CO2 PCS at
higher temperatures. Based on efficiency and performance modeling done by Alexander
Ludington of MIT, trends were developed to understand the relationship between increasing
temperature and efficiency. As shown in the previous section, increasing the core outlet
temperature results in higher overall efficiencies. When comparing the S-CO 2 cycle and the
Rankine cycle as seen in Figure 4.3, the slope of the line describing these relationships are
different. The slope for the S-CO 2 cycle is much steeper, indicating that the efficiency will
increase more for the same change in outlet temperature. There is a critical point where these
efficiencies are the same for either cycle, and this point has been determined at 518*C.
Therefore, for any core outlet temperature higher than this critical point, the S-CO2 cycle will be
more efficient. With a core outlet temperature of 5500C, this efficiency gain through switching
PCS options may be about 0.75% [Ludington, 2009].
Figure 4.3 - Efficiency Comparison with Varying Core Outlet Temperature
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Efficiency at 51*C 40.12% 40.3%
Efficiency at 530*C 41.1% 40.7%
% Increase +1.0% +0.4%
Taking into account both the effects of capital cost reductions and efficiency gains with the
Supercritical CO2 cycle, there is the potential for a significant reduction in electricity cost. In
Table 4.11, the comparison of the two cycles is shown with a core outlet temperature of 550 0C.
The decrease in LUEC is nearly 2% only from this single change.
Table 4.11 - Effect of S-CO2 Cycle on Capital Cost and LUEC ($2007)
Rankine Cycle at 550*C S-CO2 Cycle at Change
550
0C
Direct Capital Cost 1906.95 M 1683.37 M - $223.58 M
(2007$)
LUEC (Mills/kw-hr) 89.91 84.50 -5.41 (-6.0%)
4.3.3 Summary
By raising the temperature and using the Supercritical CO2 cycle, the overall efficiency of the
Sodium Fast Reactor can be increased. The benefits of these changes are summarized below in
Table 4.12 showing that a savings on capital cost of $223.58 million (11.9%) yields a total cost
of electricity savings of 8.5%, if both higher core outlet temperatures and SCO 2 cycles are used
for SFR applications.
Table 4.12 - Maximum Potential Savings through Efficiency Gains ($2007)
Direct Capital LUEC Savings
Cost (Mills/kw-hr)
Rankine Cycle at 1906.95 M 92.34 -
510
0C
Rankine Cycle at 1906.95 M 89.91 2.43 (2.6%)
550
0 C
S-C02 Cycle at 1683.37 M 84.50 7.84 (8.5%)
550
0 C
4.4 Case Study 3 - Manufacturing the Steam Generator as Non-Safety Grade
The steam generator is the largest individual direct expense in the construction of the ALMR,
comprising over 10% of the total direct capital cost. Therefore, it may be a target for possible
large-scale savings. Due to the magnitude of its contribution to overall cost, any reduction in
cost of the component will have a large impact on the overall cost.
4.4.1 Risk-Informed Special Treatment Requirements for Reactors
Recent changes have been proposed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the
special treatment requirements within the scope of structures, systems and components (SSCs).
These changes would make use of a risk-informed process to evaluate the safety significance of
each SSC, and allow for a more focused determination of which will require special treatment
requirements under 10 CFR 50.69. These special treatment requirements determine the cost of
the components largely due to the demands of various safety classifications.
10 CFR 50.69 describes four classes of SSCs: RISC 1, 2, 3 and 4 [1OCFR50.69].
Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC) -1 Safety-related SSCs that perform safety
significant functions
Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC) -2 Nonsafety-related SSCs that perform safety
significant functions
Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC) -3 Safety-related SSCs that perform low safety
significant functions
Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC) -4 Nonsafety-related SSCs that perform low
safety significant functions
SSCs within RISC Class 1 are currently subject to special treatment requirements and would
remain subject to these requirements. SSCs that would fall into this category would be those that
are concluded to be significant contributors to plant safety through the risk-informed
categorization process. An example of a Class 1 component would be the components within the
scram system, such as the electrical equipment required to send the signal to scram.
SSCs within RISC Class 2 are not presently subject to special treatment requirements, as they are
items that were previously categorized as non-safety related. Examples of these components
could include emergency diesel generators or startup feedwater pumps. These SSCs might need
to have requirements to maintain reliability and availability as determined through the plant
PRA.
SSCs within RISC Class 3 are currently subject to special treatment requirements, but are items
that can be shown through the risk-informed categorization process to not be significant
contributors to plant safety. If a component was deemed to fall within this class, it would still
need to meet functional requirements, but with a reduced level of quality assurance. For these
items, the level of assurance provided by the commercial grade programs shall be sufficient.
SSCs within RISC Class 4 are not subject to special treatment requirements, and will continue to
be beyond the scope of special treatment requirements [McKenna and Reed, 2001].
The major change lies within RISC Class 3. According to the CFR, the categorization process
must "consider results and insights form the plant-specific PRA." This change allows the
licensee to use the results of PRA analysis to remove items from the special treatment
requirements. These special treatment requirements vary by individual component, but they
include additional design considerations, qualification of materials, documentation, reporting,
maintenance, testing, surveillance and quality assurance above and beyond the industry-
established requirements classified only as commercial grade [McKenna and Reed, 2001]. These
additional requirements may add a significant cost to these SSCs. Therefore, the opportunity to
remove some of these special treatment requirements by classifying an item as RISC Class 3
presents a significant opportunity for capital cost reduction.
Therefore, if it can be shown through a risk-informed process that the steam generator is not a
significant contributor to the overall safety of the plant, it may be removed from the safety grade
category.
4.4.2 Use of PRA to Confirm Safety Standards
As described previously, the effect of manufacturing the steam generator as non-safety grade will
be reflected through changes the PRA analysis. According to the TNF, if an item is not
manufactured to safety grade standards, it cannot be accounted for in the LBE determination.
Therefore, when determining the frequency of any event that involves the steam generator, the
probability of failure for its function should be set to 1.0, simulating that it will always fail. In
order to determine the impact of this change, the PRA event trees must be analyzed to determine
what function the steam generator will play in an accident scenario, and how it will act to prevent
or mitigate any possible core damage scenario. For this analysis, the fault trees from the PRISM
PRA will be used to initially determine what role the steam generator will have in all accident
scenarios. An example of one fault tree from the PRA is shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4 -Sample Event Tree from PRISM
SHUTDOWN INHERENT
HEAT SHWN DOWN Sequence Sequence
REMOVALVIA HEAT Clas Prob.
IHTS REMOVAL
eIr Ryoo
Si 9.700E-1
3. OO Si 2.997&21.00-3 S3 3.OOOE-5
Si 4.220E-9
Si 1.304&10
3.0o2 1.00E-3 S3 1.305E-13
Si 1.104E-9
F1 3.596E-11
3.001-2 1.o-3 5 3.OOOE- 4
F1 3.755E-14
F1 3.055E-9
3.001-2 F1 9.441E-10
3 1.001-3 S3 9.450E-13
F3 3.395E-9
3.001-2 F3 1.049E-10
3 2 1.003 F3S 1.050E-13
F3 1.477E-16
3.OO-2 F3 4.583E-18I.E-3 F3S 4.567E-21
Si 4.506&23
F1 3.667E-17
3. 002 F1 1.133E-181.001-3 HIS 1.134E-21
H3 4.074&18
3.00E-2 1.0 H3 1.259E-19
3 H3S 1.280E-22
F1 5.589E-17
F1 2.169E-20
3.001-2 F1 6.702B-22S3 6.709E-25
F3 5.423E-23
3.001-2 F3 1.676E-241.00-3 F3S 1.677E-27
F3 2.359E-25
3.001-2 F3 7.289E-27
1.00-3 F3S 7.296E-30
Si 1.399E-11
F1 5.432E-15
3001E-2 F1 1.678&16
1.00E.3 HIS 1.680E-19
H3 1.358&17
3.01-2 ~ H3 4.180E-192 1.003 H3S 4.2005-22
Si, S3, S5 Loss of Shutdown Heat Removal
Fl, F3, F3S Loss of Flow Accident
H3, HIS, H3S Unprotected Loss of Heat Sink Accident
*Accident severity increasing with higher numbers
As can be seen from the event tree, the steam generator is one of several means of heat removal
during an accident scenario. In fact, this is the only contribution towards safety that the steam
generator provides during any accident in this type of reactor. According to the PRA, the steam
generator can provide emergency heat removal as an auxiliary heat removal system through
steam venting while water is available [Hackford, 1986].
Referring to the discussion on RAW value from Chapter 2, the RAW value for the Steam
Generator represents its importance in the safety case to mitigate any potential accidents. As
seen in Table 2.1, the RAW value for the steam generator is 1.01. This shows that this
component does not contribute much to the mitigation of any dominant sequences. Based on the
results from the PRA, the steam generator can be removed from the safety grade category.
4.4.3 Economic Impact
Nuclear safety-grade products such as valves and piping have been shown to have a premium of
2 to 6 times the cost of a commercial grade product, due to the bolstered requirements in quality
assurance for a safety grade item [Coords, 2008]. If the same reductions were feasible with the
steam generator, it is possible that over 50% savings on this item could be realized. Given that in
the ALMR model the steam generator makes up about 10% of the total direct capital cost, these
savings could translate into large overall savings.
On first look, the main drawback to removing the steam generator from the safety-grade category
is with the issue of availability. A steam generator manufactured under commercial guidelines
would have a greater probability of failure, most likely in the form of a sodium-water or sodium-
steam leak. While it has been shown that this is not a major issue for the release of radiation as
covered in the PRA, a tube leak within the steam generation equipment would result in a reduced
availability. Therefore, the non-safety grade steam generator must be manufactured to certain
performance standards to ensure proper operation.
As stated previously, changes have been proposed to 10 CFR Part 50 that may allow for this
reduction in safety grade. In the Regulatory Guide 1.26, the design criteria laid out within 10
CFR Part 50 are summarized, presenting four different quality groups that SSCs must fall into to
satisfy the general design criteria, specific to the "Water, Steam, and Radioactive Waste
Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants"[10 CFR Appendix A]. These are given as
Quality Groups A through D. Group A corresponds only to components of the reactor coolant
boundary that must be designed, fabricated, erected and tested to the most stringent standards.
Therefore, the remainder of the components falls within Quality Groups B, C or D. Quality
Group B standards should be applied to safety related components within the reactor coolant
boundary. Quality Group C standards should be applied to safety related components that are
not part of the reactor coolant boundary. Quality Group D standards should be applied to all
other water or steam containing components that are not included in Quality Groups B or C. The
standards of these Quality Groups are described in Table 4.13 [U.S. NRC, Regulatory Guide
1.26].
Table 4.13 - Quality Standards from Regulatory Guide 1.26
Component Quality Group B Quality Group C Quality Group D
Pressure ASME Boiler and ASME Boiler and ASME Boiler and
Vessels Pressure Vessel Code, Pressure Vessel Code, Pressure Vessel Code,
Section III, "Rules for Section III, "Rules for Section VIII, Division 1,
Construction of Construction of "Rules for Construction
Nuclear Facility Nuclear Facility of Pressure Vessels"
Components," Class 2 Components," Class 3
Piping As above As above ASME B3 1.1
Pumps As above As above Manufacturers' standards
Valves As above As above ASME B3 1.1
Using the ALMR model as a reference, the steam generator was originally designed to be
manufactured under their High Grade Industrial Standards (HGIS) in the 1993 ALMIR design
[Oda, 1993] before being upgraded to safety-grade in the 1994 ALMR Design [Gokcek et al,
1995]. Therefore, despite the proposal to remove the steam generator from the safety grade
category, it must still perform at the standards originally established in the 1993 design. Under
this design, the steam generator will be designed, fabricated, installed and inspected as a Group
D component. However, according to the design description, there are many areas where higher
standards are used to assure that the owners' investment is adequately protected. As shown in
Table 4.14, the majority of the requirements for the HGIS include using the ASME Section III
standards rather than the Section VIII and B3 1.1 Codes.
Table 4.14 - ALMR High Grade Industrial Standards
Requirement HGIS Requirement
Overall QA Program ASME NQA-2
Design and Analysis ASME Section III
Material Supplier QA and ASME Section III
Program
Qualification of Weld ANSI B31.1
Procedures and Personnel
Control of Weld Rod ASME Section III
Chemistry
Radiograph Welds ASME Section III
Pressure Test ASME Section III
Helium Leak Test ASME Section III
ISI ASME Section III
Certification of NDE ANSI B3 1.1
Personnel
Lifetime Records ANSI B3 1.1
Retention
These High Grade Industrial Standards are almost as stringent as those that would be required of
a Safety Grade, Quality Group C component. By requiring the use of the same codes from
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, "Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility
Components," the steam generator will be nearly manufactured to Safety Grade standards in
order to meet performance and warranty requirements. These results seem to indicate that,
contrary to the possible savings that were initially suggested, these savings will not be
significantly large. The only areas where there may be savings are in the QA Program and the
retention of fabrication records. According to Melita Osborne of Westinghouse Nuclear
Engineering, there may be possible savings of 5-10% with these simplifications [Osborne, 2009].
This would result in a decrease of total direct capital cost by around 0.5%. Rather than changing
from safety grade to non-safety grade, Westinghouse suggests that the best way to achieve cost
reductions in the steam generator is to reduce the amount of hardware required, by utilizing
fewer valves and shorter pipe runs.
4.5 Case Study 4 - Control Rods
4.5.1 Use of PRA to Identify
The ALMR reactor design includes six control rods per module that would be used to scram the
reactor if faced with any of the initiators requiring control rods for shutdown. This is a similar
layout as presented in the PRISM PRA, which can be used as an example for this purpose.
Referring to Chapter 2, the SCRAM LEF is 38, showing some room for flexibility in design. In
addition, if changes can be made without modifying any probabilities, there would be no effect
on the PRA under the TNF approach.
Within Appendix A of the PRISM PRA, fault trees are presented for a "Single Control Rod
Insertion" as well as for the "Reactor Shutdown System for Initiators which Require one Control
Rod for Shutdown"[Hackford, 1986]. See Figures 4.5 and Figure 4.6. The first fault tree shows
the possible failures and probabilities of these failures for each control rod, with the final failure
probability of a single rod at 5.78 x 10-6. The second fault tree begins with each of the six
control rods and shows the probability of all six failing randomly along with all six failing due to
a common cause failure (CCF). In this sequence, the probability of all six failing randomly is
almost zero, and the CCF frequency tends to drive the overall probability of failure of the
Reactor Shutdown System (RSS). It is due to this reasoning that a proposal can be made to
reduce the number of control rods.
The listed frequency for CCF of three or more rods is 5.78 x 10-9, which is three orders of
magnitude lower than the single rod failure probability. With two rods, the random failure
frequency of all control rods drops to 3.34 x 10-1, and with three this frequency falls even
further to 1.9 x 10-16. Therefore even with only two rods, the CCF frequency would determine
the failure frequency of the RSS based on the fault tree in Figure 4.6 [Hackford, 1986]. Using
the PRA, it can be shown that the frequency of scram failure will not increase by reducing the
number of control rods. Accounting for the requirement for redundancy in safety systems, three
control rods rather than six will be sufficient to meet the safety requirements of the scram system
[Johnson, 2009].
Figure 4.5 - Fault Tree for a Single Control Rod Insertion
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Figure 4.6 - Fault Tree for RSS for Initiators which Require 1 Control Rodfor
Shutdown
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4.5.2 Economic Impact
From the 1994 ALMR cost estimate presented in Table 2.3, the control rods and control rod
drives make up 1.33% of the total direct capital cost of the reactor. This cost is $13.79 million
per reactor block [Gokcek et al, 1995]. Since the control rod drives are each independent units,
this total cost should be very close to the individual cost multiplied by the number of units [El-
Sheikh, 1994]. With a reduction from six to three control rods, this figure will be halved.
Therefore, there is potential for cost savings of about 0.65% from the direct capital cost due to
this change, about $6.9 million per reactor block.
Chapter 5 - Summary and Future Work
5.1 Summary
These four sample cases showed the potential of the cost reduction methodology by the
application of the Technology Neutral Framework and applying alternative design options to
improve thermal efficiency for sodium cooled fast reactors. This list is not exhaustive but
provides a basis for further design optimization without affecting overall safety performance in
terms of meeting safety standards. These four case studies showed the following economic
results:
Case Study 1 - Removal of ECDA from LBEs
e Provides justification for the use of the smaller containment and the design without
redundant safety-grade decay heat removal loops
o Potential Benefit - savings up to 5% of direct capital cost
e Allows for the operation at higher temperatures, up to cladding temperature limits of
potentially 550C
o Potential Benefit - up to 1% increase in plant efficiency with traditional PCS
Total capital cost savings: $98.4 million (5.4% of direct capital cost)
Estimated cost of electricity: 89.91 mills/kw-hr (- 4.2% of original estimate)
Case Study 2 - Increasing Efficiency
e With Supercritical CO2 PCS, smaller turbomachinery may lead to large savings in capital
cost
o Potential Benefit - savings up to 12% of direct capital cost
e At higher temperatures, the S-CO 2 cycle operates at higher efficiencies than the Rankine
cycle
o Potential Benefit - a further 0.75% increase in efficiency, 1.75% increase in
efficiency from using Rankine cycle at 51 0*C
Total capital cost savings: $223.6 (11.9% of direct capital cost)
Estimated cost of electricity: 84.50 mills/kw-hr (- 8.5% of original estimate)
Case Study 3 - Manufacturing Steam Generator as Non-Safety Grade
* Does not result in significant savings due to performance and reliability standards
o Potential Benefit - Negligible cost savings, may help with licensing
Case Study 4 - Reduce Number of Control Rods
* Due to the common cause failure dominating sequences when the design has more than
three control rods, six are not necessary
o Potential Benefit - savings up to 0.65% direct capital cost
Total capital cost savings: $13.8 million (0.7% of direct capital cost)
Estimated cost of electricity: 92.10 mills/kw-hr (-0.3% of original estimate)
If all of these design alternatives were implemented in the design of the pool-type SFR, the total
economic benefit could be as seen in Table 5.1. The capital cost reduction over the standard
pool type sodium cooled fast reactor would be about $335.8 million - almost a 17% reduction.
The new LUEC could be as low as 84.28 mills/kw-hr, representing a reduction of over 10%.
This reduction cuts in half the estimated difference in electricity cost between SFRs and LWRs.
With further changes and more detailed information, greater reductions may be possible to bring
these numbers even closer.
Table 5.1 - Total Economic Benefits from Potential Design Alternatives (2007$)
SFR w/o design SFR with all Reduction %
alternatives suggested changes in cost Change
Direct Capital Cost $2005.33 $1669.55 M $335.8 M -16.7%
LUEC (Mills/kw -hr) 93.89 84.28 9.61 -10.3%
Relative to LWR at +24.3% +13.7%
75.56 mills/kw-hr
5.2 Future Work
The work in this project has helped to demonstrate the risk and performance-based methodology
to improve the economic feasibility of the Sodium Fast Reactor. However, the scope of this
research has been limited by the availability of detailed cost information to analyze more broad
design alternatives. For example, if reliable and detailed cost information could be obtained for
a loop-type SFR, it would be an interesting study to compare the benefits and drawbacks of the
loop versus pool type.
In addition, the economic model could be bolstered by further research into the areas of the fuel
cycle and the operations and maintenance costs. These numbers have only been assumed from
the ALMR reports for the sake of this research, but it would be important to gain a better
understanding of these inputs in order to create a complete economic model. With more insight
into the fuel cycle and its associated costs, the design alternative of metal versus oxide fuel could
be investigated more thoroughly. Furthermore, the benefits of on-site reprocessing versus a
central reprocessing center and other economic variables in closing the fuel cycle could be
studied which could affect the fuel cycle choice.
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Appendix A - G4-ECONS Data for ALMR
Table A-1 shows the data inputs used for the G4-ECONS model to develop the economic model
for the ALMR. Table A-2 shows the outputs that were given by the model using this data.
Table A.1 -ALMR Input Values for G4-ECONS
Description
Model Start Year (not presently used) 0
ALMR
2-Block
scaled
to 2007$
with
some
LWR
Case Description values
Reactor Plant Description 0
Year Adjust 1
Hours in a Day 24
Days in a Year 365
Site Size (Acres) n/a
Site Size (Hectares) n/a
Reactor Net Electrical Capacity 1243
Reactor Average Capacity Factor over Life 85%
Thermodynamic Efficiency (net) 37%
Plant Economic and Operational Life 40
Years to Construct (up to 10 years allowed) 6
Cost per Acre for land (for Greenfield sites only) [cost per hectare is calculated
by model] n/a
Average craft labor rate (for detailed capital cost breakdowns) n/a
Financial environment defining discount rate 0
Cost of Capital for Interest during Construction & Amortization 11%
Estimated D&D cost for Reactor at end-of-life (use 33% of direct cap cost [total for 20 series of accts]
if no estimate available) 2550
Non-Fuel Operational Annual Recurring Costs for Reactor
On-site Staffing cost 22.80
Pensions and Benefits 6.80
Consumables 19.30
M
Repair Costs 0.00
Charges on working Capital 6.40
Purchased services & subcontracts 6.80
Insurance premiums & taxes 3.00
Regulatory fees 0.00
Radioactive waste management 7.30
Other General and Administrative (G&A) 0.00
Capital replacements as a % of direct capital (for LWR typically << 0.5% of
direct [account 20 series] cost per year) 0.0%
Contingency on non-fuel O&M cost 38.00
Fuel Material and Refuelling Data
PuO2
Fuel Assembly Description MOX
Heavy metal mass of fuel assembly 0
Fuel assemblies in Full Core 220
Fuel assemblies per Reload 55
Average time between refuelings 2.00
Fuel Assembly Information
Fuel cycle code 3
UOX fuel if open cycle n/a
MOX fuel if open cycle (future use) n/a
Switch for activation of enrichment plant tails assay optimization algorithm n/a
Tails assay for virgin U fed and reprocessed U fed enrichment plants (if tails
assay opt switch = "OFF") n/a
Enrichment level of feed to enrichment plant for virgin EU (uranium) n/a
Enrichment level of feed to enrichment plant for reprocessed EU (uranium) n/a
Required U-enrichment level for virgin EU reactor fuel (initial [first] core
average) n/a
Required U-enrichment level for virgin EU reactor fuel (reload average) n/a
Required U-enrichment level for reprocessed EU reactor fuel (reload average) n/a
U-235 content of DU diluent for higher actinide-bearing fuels, e.g. MOX reloads
or FR reloads 0.250%
Pu fraction in HM for higher actinide bearing fuels (initial cores), e.g. MOX 0
Pu fraction in HM for higher actinide bearing fuels (reloads), e.g. MOX 0
Non-Pu higher actinide fraction (AmNp,etc) for higher act-bearing fuels
(transmutation fuels) 0
Reprocessing Material Balance Data
Percentage of Spent Fuel which is U 1
Percentage of Spent Fuel which is Pu 0
Percentage of Spent Fuel which is FP (fission products) 0
Percentage of SF which is non-Pu minor actinides (Np, AmCm) 0
Percentage of fission products which are segregated for targets or special
1 disposition/transmutation 0
M
Nuclear material Source Unit Costs
Source Depleted U Ops: Storage, Conversion, Makeup-REPU Blend (for fast
reactor feed: FC=3 ) 10
Source Pu Storage & Treatment (for fast reactor feed if not from dedicated
reprocessing) FC=3 0
Uranium Ore (Mining and Milling U308) [model converts $/lbU308 to
$/kgU] FC=1 or 2 n/a
Intermediate Fuel Cycle Step Unit Costs
Oxide to UF6 conversion (natural or virgin EU) n/a
Reprocess. U chemical form (such as UNH or metal) to UF6 conversion (REPU)
[ for Fuel Assy path: FA] n/a
Enrichment for non-REPU (Virgin) UF6 n/a
Enrichment for REPU UF6 [Fuel Assembly path: FA] n/a
Fabrication of virgin EU fuel n/a
Fabrication of reprocessed U fuel (REPU) [Fuel Assembly path: FA] n/a
DUO2-diluent conversion for MOX (DUF6 or DU308 to spec DUO2 powder for
MOX fabrication) n/a
Purchase or Fabrication of mixed actinide fuels incl MOX & FR variants
(drivers + blankets) 2500
Fabrication of special transmutation targets ( higher actinides or certain fission
products) 0
Outside reactor bldg spent fuel storage (before repository
transport/emplacement or reprocessing) 60
Cost of spent fuel reprocessing (head end and separations component) 10600
End States for Major Materials (Unit Costs)
DUF6 conv/storage/ geologic disposal as impure U308 (enrichment plant
DUF6 tails) n/a
Excess PuO2 & other higher actinide oxide storage (from reprocessing) FC=3 2000
Path switch for REPU: Credited fuel assys = FA (fuel assembly path) Storage
only = STO Treatment, packaging, & geologic disp of REPU form = GEO n/a
Conversion, Pkg, & Permanent Geologic Disposal of reprocessed U (GEO) n/a
Storage only of Excess REPU from reprocessing (STO) n/a
Treatment, Pkg, & Geol Disp of separated HLW waste from reprocessing 600
Treatment, Pkg, & Geol Disp of TRU & other non-HLW waste from
reprocessing 100
Treatment, Pkg, & Geol Disp or Stg of special separated fission products from
reprocessing 0
Geological Repository. disposition of spent fuel (waste fee in mills/Kwh or cost
in $/kgHM) open cycle only 0.0
Geo. Repository disposition of spent fuel: switch indicating cost unit above
(ENERGY-mills/kwh MTHM=$/kgHM) n/a
Contingency on overall fuel cycle cost 0.00
Capitalised Pre-Construction Costs
Land and land rights 9.14
100
Site permits 0.00
Plant licensing 0.00
Plant permits 0.00
Plant studies 0.00
Plant reports 0.00
Reserved for other activity as needed 0.00
Reserved for other activity as needed 0.00
Contingency on 11-18 above 0.00
Caitsed Direct Costs 
___
Buildings, Structures, & Improvements on Site 358.80
Reactor Plant equipment 908.69
Turbine/Generator Plant equipment 335.37
Electrical equipment 130.28
Water intake and heat rejection plant 91.39
Miscellaneous plant equipment 82.42
Special materials 0.00
Simulator 0.00
Contingency on 21-28 above 0.00
Capi#sed Support Series
Design Services at A/E Offices (home office) 99.10
PM/CM Services at A/E Offices (home office) 0.00
Design services at plant site (field office) 121.32
PM/CM services at plant site (field office) 0.00
Construction supervision at plant site (field supervision) 218.78
Field indirect costs (rentals, temp facilities, etc) 0.00
Plant commissioning services 0.00
Plant operation-demonstration run 0.00
Contingency on 31-38 above 0.00
Capitalised Operation Costs
Staff recruitment and training 0.00
Staff housing facilities 0.00
Staff salary-related costs 0.00
Reserved 0.00
Reserved 0.00
Other Owners' capital investment costs 318.69
Reserved 0.00
Reserved 0.00
Contingency on 41-48 above 0.00
Capitalised Supplementary Costs
Shipping & transportation costs 0.00
Spare parts and supplies 0.00
101
Taxes 0.00
Insurance 0.00
Reserved 0.00
Reserved 0.00
Reserved 0.00
Contingency on 51-58 above 0.00
Method by Which Overall Capital Contingency is Handled (Summed Sub-Cont,
Percentage, or Entered Value)
Method designator Zero, Percentage or Value (ZER, PCT, or VAL) VAL
Percentage used if PCT option is selected and line 124,134,144,154,and 163 are
zeroed n/a
Contingency value in $M to be entered if lines 124,134, 144, 154, and 163 are
zeroed 1091.50
Other Financials
Real Escalation (beyond general inflation) 0.00
Fees/Royalties 0.00
Contingency on 61-68 (reflects fin/schedule uncertainty) 0.00
Other
Capacity Factor Reduction (A contingency on reactor performance; may be
calculated in future) 0.0%
Code 64 (for possible future use) 0.00
Code 65 (for possible future use) 0.00
Code 66 (for possible future use) 0.00
Code 67 (for possible future use) 0.00
Code 68 (for possible future use) 0.00
Table A.2 - ALMR outputsfrom G4-ECONS nodel
RESULTS: LUEC
Components for most-recently
calculated strategy #
8 1
Capital 64.79 mills/kwh
O&M 11.93 mills/kwh
Fuel Cycle 15.15 mills/kwh
D&D 0.47 mills/kwh
TOTAL 92.34 mills/kwh
Spec TCIC 4304 $/kw(e)
